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1995]
UNITED STATES v. ONE 1973 ROLLS ROYCE: THE CONFUSION
CONTINUES IN INTERPRETING DRUG FORFEITURE
STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the increasing number of drug crimes in the United
States, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 (Drug Control Act).' The Drug Control Act provided
the basis for the current forfeiture scheme found in § 881 of Title 21 of
the United States Code (§ 881).2 The Drug Control Act originally pro-
vided for government seizure of illegal substances, the raw materials and
equipment relating to the manufacture and distribution of the substances,
any item used as a container to transport the substances, all conveyances
used to transport the drugs or to facilitate the transactions, and all reports
relating to the drug transactions.3 In 1978, Congress amended the Drug
1. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, Title II, § 511(a), 84 Stat. 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (1994)); H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567. The legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Drug Control Act) reveals the princi-
pal purpose of the bill:
This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with
the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States (1) through pro-
viding authority for increased efforts in drug abuse prevention and reha-
bilitation of users, (2) through providing more effective means for law
enforcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and control, and (3) by
providing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties for of-
fenses involving drugs.
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CA.N.
4566, 4567. See generally Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on America ?, 3 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REv. 242 (1991) (discussing problem of drug crimes in America).
2. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act § 511; seeAlice M.
O'Brien, Note, "Caught in the Crossfire": Protecting the Innocent Owner of Real Property
from Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 521, 521
(1991) (explaining Drug Control Act's foundation of today's asset forfeiture). See
generallyJimmy Gurule, Symposium: The Ancient Roots of Modern Forfeiture Law, 21 J.
LEGIS. 155, 156-57 (1995) (providing historical overview of forfeiture schemes);
Michael F. Zeldin & Roger G. Weiner, Innocent Third Parties and Their Rights in
Forfeiture Proceedings, 28 AM. CriM. L. REv. 843, 843-44 (same); Robert E. Blacher,
Comment, Clearing the Smoke From the Battlefield: Understanding Congressional Intent
Regarding the Innocent Owner Provision of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 85J. CRJM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 502, 504-08 (1994) (same); Ron Champoux, Note, Real Property Under Fed-
eral Drug Laws: Does the Punishment Outweigh the Crime?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
247, 249-50 (1992) (same); Damon G. Saltzburg, Note, Real Property Forfeitures as a
Weapon in the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership
Rights, 72 B.U. L. REv. 217, 220-21 (1992) (same).
3. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act § 511 (a) (codi-
fied as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994)). The Drug Control Act provided in
pertinent part:
(723)
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Control Act, specifically amending § 881, to increase the scope of civil for-
feiture. 4 This amendment provides that all moneys and other things of
value that a party received in exchange for a controlled substance is sub-
ject to forfeiture under § 881 (a) (6) .5 In 1984, Congress again amended
the Drug Control Act, adding § 881 (a) (7) and thereby broadening the
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, dis-
tributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this tide.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which
are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding,
processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled sub-
stance in violation of this title.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container
for property described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are
used; or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facili-
tate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of
property described in paragraph (1) or (2), except that ....
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of
this title.
Id.; see Gurule, supra note 2, at 157-58 (discussing scope of Drug Control Act);
Blacher, supra note 2, at 506 (same).
4. See Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, Title III,
§ 301(a)(1), 92 Stat. 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)); Gurule,
supra note 2, at 158 (discussing 1978 amendments); Blacher, supra note 2, at 507
(same).
5. Psychotropic Substances Act § 301 (a) (1). The Psychotropic Substances Act
amendment to the Drug Control Act provides, in pertinent part:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange
for a controlled substance in violation of this tide, all proceeds traceable
to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securi-
ties used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this title,
except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the
extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission estab-
lished by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id. (codified at § 881(a) (6) (1994)).
The legislative history of the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978 provides:
The criminal justice system can only be effective if there is a mean-
ingful deterrent. It is important that the offender be aware of the risk he
[or she) is running.. . . The amendment I propose here today is in-
tended to enhance the efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs in the
United States by striking out against the profits from illicit drug
trafficking.
124 CONG. REc. 23,055 (1978) (statement of Sen. Nunn). Senator Culver similarly
stated: "The purpose of the proposed amendment is to help combat the flow of
illicit drugs in the United States by striking at profits from illicit drug trafficking."
Id. at 23,056.
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scope of forfeitable property to include all real property used to facilitate a
drug transaction. 6
To ameliorate the potential harshness from the amendments, Con-
gress included an "innocent owner" defense under § 881 (a) (6) and (7).7
Under § 881 (a) (6) and (7), no owner's interest in property shall be for-
feited "by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner."8  Subsequently, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 added
6. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II,§ 306(a), 98 Stat. 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (1994)). This amend-
ment to § 881 provides for the forfeiture of:
[a]ll real property, including any right, title, and interest in the
whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit,
or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this title punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be for-
feited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.; see Gurule, supra note 2, at 158-59 (discussing 1984 amendments); Blacher,
supra note 2, at 507-08 (same).
Congress further amended § 881 (a) (7) in 1988 by adding "(including any
leasehold interest)" after "any right, title, and interest." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title V, § 5105, 102 Stat. 4301 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a) (7) (1994)).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6), (7) (1988). Congress included an "innocent owner"
defense in the 1978 amendments to the Drug Control Act, which added the
§ 881 (a) (6) forfeiture of "moneys." Psychotropic Substances Act § 301 (a) (1)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994)). Senator Nunn stated at the hearings
on this amendment:
[W]e did add a provision in the modification to make it clear that a bona
fide party who has no knowledge or consent to the property he owns
having been derived from illegal transactions, that party would be able to
establish that fact under this amendment and forfeiture would not occur.
124 CONG. REc. 23,057 (1978). Additionally, Congress included an "innocent
owner" defense to the forfeiture of real property when it added subsection (7)
pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Comprehensive
Crime Control Act § 306(a).
The "innocent owner" defense was added in response to § 881's expansive
approach to forfeitable property. See Blacher, supra note 2, at 503 ("Recognizing
the potentially harsh effects of the statute, Congress provided an affirmative de-
fense to owners of real property who are innocent of illegal activity.") In the ab-
sence of such a defense, owners who innocently leased or loaned property to
others could lose the property in a forfeiture proceeding. United States v. One
1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 799 (3d Cir. 1994). For example, a landlord could
forfeit an apartment complex if a tenant was caught dealing drugs from an apart-
ment. Id. The "innocent owner" defenses protected these "innocent owners." Id.
See generally Blacher, supra note 2, at 509-10 (discussing Congress' addition of "in-
nocent owner" defenses); Champoux, supra note 2, at 253-54 (stating "innocent
owner" defense under § 881(a) (7) "easier to mount" than previous constitutional
defense which required owner to establish that he was " 'uninvolved in and una-
ware of the wrongful activity, but also, that he had done all that reasonably could
be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property' " (quoting Calero-To-
ledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974))).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6), (7) (1994).
1995] NOTE
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§ 881 (a) (4) (C) to the forfeiture scheme, providing that "no conveyance
shall be forfeited... to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of
any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner."
9
The courts have encountered difficulty in interpreting the precise
meaning of the "innocent owner" defense.1 0 At the heart of the debate is
the proper interpretation of the "without the knowledge or consent" lan-
guage of § 881 (a) (6) and (7).11 More specifically, the issue is whether an
owner must establish lack of knowledge and lack of consent to avoid
9. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title VI, § 6075(l)-
(3), 102 Stat. 4324 (1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) (C) (1994)). See gener-
ally Michael Goldsmith & MarkJ. Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights:
The Need For Further Law Reform, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1254, 1267-82 (discussing history
behind enactment of § 881 (a) (4) (C)). For a discussion of the legislative history of
§ 881 (a) (4) (C), see infra notes 104, 115 and accompanying text.
10. Compare United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 814 (3d Cir.
1994) (adopting disjunctive reading of "without the knowledge, consent, or willful
blindness" language of § 881 (a) (4) (C) as applied to post-illegal-act transferees);
United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 (11th Cir. 1992)
(adopting disjunctive interpretation of "knowledge or consent" language of
§ 881(a) (7) as applied to pre-illegal-act owner); United States v. 141st St. Corp.,
911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) (adopting disjunctive interpretation of "without
the knowledge or consent" language of § 881 (a) (7) as applied to owner of apart-
ment building used to facilitate drug transactions), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109
(1991) and United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989)
(adopting disjunctive interpretation of "without the knowledge or consent" lan-
guage of § 881 (a) (7)) with United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1452-
53 (11th Cir. 1995) (adopting conjunctive interpretation of "without the knowl-
edge or consent" language of § 881 (a) (7) as applied to post-illegal-act transferees);
United States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle, 9 F.3d 74, 76 (9th Cir. 1993) (adopting
conjunctive interpretation of "knowledge or consent" language of § 881 (a) (6) and
stating that § 881 (a) (6) "bars an owner with knowledge of the origin of the prop-
erty in drug proceeds from asserting 'the innocent owner defense' "); United
States v. 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 1991) (adopting conjunc-
tive interpretation of "without the knowledge or consent" language of § 881 (a) (6)
as applied to pre-illegal-act owner) and United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443,
1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (adopting conjunctive interpretation of "with-
out the knowledge or consent" language of § 881(a)(7)). For an explanation of
the conjunctive interpretation versus the disjunctive interpretation, see text ac-
companying infra note 12.
11. See generally Zeldin & Weiner, supra note 1, at 848-49 (recognizing two
general viewpoints regarding appropriate interpretation of "knowledge or con-
sent" language of "innocent owner" defense); Champoux, supra note 2, at 253-56
(discussing courts' different interpretations of "knowledge or consent" language
and discussing courts' various interpretations of "knowledge" and "consent"); Kirs-
ten M. Dunne, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act: Does Knowledge Equal Consent?, 20 J. LEGIS. 81, 81 (1994)
(acknowledging circuit split in interpreting "knowledge or consent" language);
Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FoRDwtAM L. REv. 471, 478-80 (1989)
(noting split among courts in interpreting "knowledge or consent"); O'Brien,
supra note 2, at 529-42 (discussing inconsistency in courts' interpretations of
"knowledge or consent" language in "innocent owner" defense). For a discussion
[Vol. 40: p. 723
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forfeiting his or her property (conjunctive approach), or whether an
owner needs to establish only lack of knowledge or lack of consent to pre-
vail under an "innocent owner" defense (disjunctive approach). 12 The
United States Courts of Appeals are divided on this precise issue.1 3 Fur-
thermore, a related judicial concern is whether the addition of the "willful
blindness" language of § 881 (a) (4) (C) requires the courts to interpret the
"innocent owner" defense of that section differently from the defenses in
§ 881 (a) (6) and (7).14
This Note explores the various interpretations of § 881's "innocent
owner" defenses, focusing on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit's analysis in United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce.15 Part II of
this Note discusses the background regarding when title to the forfeited
property vests in the government.1 6 Part III reviews the various ap-
proaches that the United States Courts of Appeals have developed to inter-
pret § 881 (a) (6) and (7).17 In doing so, Part III will analyze how different
circuits have handled precedent, legislative history, rules of statutory con-
struction and policy-based arguments.1 8 Then, Part 1V of this Note exam-
ines the district court's and the Third Circuit's differing approaches to the
interpretation of the "innocent owner" defense of § 881 (a) (4) (C) in
United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce.19 Part V analyzes the Third Circuit's
of the various circuit courts' interpretations of the "knowledge or consent" lan-
guage, see infra notes 31-85, 112-53 and accompanying text.
12. See generally Zeldin & Weiner, supra note 2, at 848 nn.31-32 (providing
exhaustive list of courts adopting conjunctive interpretation and those adopting
disjunctive interpretation of "knowledge or consent" language); O'Brien, supra
note 2, at 530 nn.46 & 48 (providing list of courts adopting conjunctive approach
and those adopting disjunctive approach). For a discussion of the cases addressing
this issue, see supra note 10.
13. For a discussion of the circuit court decisions creating a split on the ap-
propriate interpretation of the "innocent owner" defenses, see supra note 10 and
infra notes 31-85, 112-53 and accompanying text.
14. See United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 812-13 (3d Cir.
1994) (concluding that tests for innocent ownership under § 881 (a) (4) (C), (a) (6)
and (a) (7) are identical and therefore construction should be consistent). See gen-
erally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 9, at 1274-82 (discussing relationship
between subsection (a) (4) and subsections (a) (6) and (7)).
15. For a discussion of the various courts' interpretations of the "innocent
owner" defenses of § 881, see infra notes 31-72 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the "innocent owner" defenses, see infra
notes 73-85, 94-100, 112-53 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of when title to forfeited property vests in the govern-
ment, see infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the circuit courts' approaches to interpreting the "in-
nocent owner" defenses of § 881 (a) (6) and (7), see infra notes 31-85 and accompa-
nying text.
18. For a discussion of the circuit courts' use of precedent, legislative history,
rules of statutory construction and policy-based arguments in interpreting § 881,
see infra notes 31-85 and accompanying text.
19. 43 F.3d 794 (3d Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of § 881 (a) (4) (C)'s "innocent owner" defense in One 1973 Rolls Royce,
see infra notes 94-153 and accompanying text.
1995] NOTE
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opinion in One 1973 Rolls Royce in light of the dissenting opinion and
other circuit courts' decisions. 20 Part VI considers the impact of the Third
Circuit's approach to civil forfeiture in drug cases and suggests an answer
to the confusion created by Congress' wording of the "innocent owner"
defenses of § 881.21 In conclusion, Part VII suggests guidelines for practi-
tioners to follow in light of One 1973 Rolls Royce.22
II. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES CIL FORFEITURE IN UNTED STATES
v 92 BUENA VISTA A VENUE
The United States Supreme Court addressed the civil forfeiture provi-
sions of Title 21 of the United States Code in United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Avenue.23 In 92 Buena Vista Avenue, the Supreme Court allowed the claim-
ant, who had allegedly purchased the property subject to forfeiture with
monetary gifts derived from illegal drug transactions, to assert an "inno-
cent owner" defense.24 The government argued that the claimant could
not assert an "innocent owner" defense because tide to the funds used to
purchase the property vested in the government at the time of the illegal
act. 25 A plurality, however, stated that a person who acquires forfeitable
property after an illegal act has occurred, but before forfeiture, may assert
the "innocent owner" defense.2 6 The Court held that title does not vest in
the government until the date of forfeiture instead of at the time of the
illegal act.27 In so holding, the Supreme Court resolved a dispute among
the circuit courts as to when title to forfeited property vested in the gov-
ernment. 28 Some circuits had held that title vested in the government at
the time of the illegal act, while others had held that title did not vest in
the government until the time of forfeiture. 29 By its holding, the Supreme
20. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's opinion in One 1973 Rolls Royce, see
infra notes 94-153 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the impact the Third Circuit's opinion will have on
drug asset forfeiture cases and a possible solution to the confusion in interpreting
§ 881, see infra notes 180-96 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of guidelines for practitioners to follow in light of One
1973 Rolls Royce, see infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
23. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
24. Id. at 1137. In 92 Buena Vista Avenue, the government sought civil forfei-
ture of real estate that was allegedly purchased with drug trafficking proceeds. Id.
at 1130. The respondent received money, which was allegedly from illegal drug
transactions, as a gift, and used the funds to purchase the property in question,
thereby subjecting the property to forfeiture under § 881(a)(6). Id.
25. Id. at 1136-37.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1137. Prior to 92 Buena Vista Avenue, some circuits held that title
vested in the government at the time of the illegal act. For a comparison of courts
that held that title vested in the government at the time of the illegal act with those
that held that title vested in the government at the time of forfeiture, see infra note
29.
28. See id. at 1131.
29. Compare In re One 1985 Nissan, 889 F.2d 1317, 1319 (4th Cir. 1989) (stat-
ing that "all right, title and interest in the property vested in the government at the
6
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time the proceeds involved or traceable thereto were generated by illegal drug
sales" and holding claimant's predecessor in interest possessed no interest in prop-
erty to pass on to claimants) and Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242, 247 (10th
Cir. 1989) (stating that when government brings forfeiture action under § 881, "a
judgment of forfeiture relates back to the time of the unlawful act, vesting title to
forfeited property in the government as of that moment. Forfeiture therefore cuts
off the rights of subsequent lienholders or purchasers, subject to the... innocent
owners exception in section 881(a)(6)"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990) with
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that
government's interest vests in property at time of actual forfeiture), aff'd, 113 S.
Ct. 1126 (1993).
In resolving the dispute as to when the government interest vests in the prop-
erty, the Supreme Court analyzed § 881 (h). 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136-
37. Section 881(h) provides: "All right, tile, and interest in property described in
subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of
the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1994).
Based on this subsection, the Government argued that the proceeds traceable to
illegal drug transactions (i.e., the funds used to purchase the property at issue) are
a kind of "property described in subsection (a)"; therefore, § 881(h) effectively
prevents such property from being the property of anyone other than the United
States. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136. Therefore, the Government argued
under the facts of 92 Buena Vista Avenue, that title to the illegal proceeds vested in
the government at the time of the illegal act. Id. Therefore, the funds, with which
the respondent purchased the property, could not have been transferred to the
respondent in the first place. Id.
The Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis and stated that although the
proceeds subject to § 881 (h) are described in subsection (a) (6), that subsection
exempts certain proceeds from being forfeited. Id. Subsection (a) (6) exempts
from forfeiture proceeds to which the owner can establish an innocent owner de-
fense. Id. The court explained:
As the Senate Report on the 1984 amendment correctly observed, the
amendment applies only to "property which is subject to civil forfeiture
under section 881(a)." [quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
215 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 33981. Under
§ 881 (a) (6), the property of one who can satisfy the innocent owner de-
fense is not subject to civil forfeiture. Because the success of any defense
available under § 881(a) will necessarily determine whether § 881(h) ap-
plies, § 881(a) (6) must allow an assertion of the defense before § 881(h)
applies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
In conclusion, the Court noted that § 881(h) did not disturb the common-law
rights of the Government or the owners of the forfeited property. Id. at 1137.
According to the Court, "[tihe common-law rule had always allowed owners to
invoke defenses made available to them before the Government's title vested, and
after title did vest, the common-law rule had always related that title back to the
date of the commission of the act that made the specific property forfeitable." Id.
Therefore, the Court's holding that title does not vest in the government until
forfeiture (as opposed to the time of the illegal act), thereby providing the owner
an "innocent owner" defense, is consistent with common law. Id.; see Gurule, supra
note 2, at 168-69 (discussing impact of 92 Buena Vista Avenue on forfeiture scheme
and questioning "whether the circuits that adopted a disjunctive reading of the
statute prior to 92 Buena Vista Avenue will continue to construe the innocent owner
defense in the disjunctive when applied to post-illegal act transferees"). See gener-
ally Michael D. Dautrich, Note, The "Innocent Owner" Defense in Civil Drug Forfeitures
After United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue: Still an Uphill Battle for Third-Party, 3
WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 995 (1994) (providing full analysis of Supreme Court decision
in 92 Buena Vista Avenue); Mosche Heching, Civil Forfeiture and the Innocent Owner
7
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Court created a new class of claimants, consisting of post-illegal-act trans-
ferees, who could assert the "innocent owner" defense under § 881.30
III. CIRCUIT OVERVIEW
A. Various Circuits' Approaches to the "Innocent Owner" Defense Under
§ 881(a)(6) and (7)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a
disjunctive interpretation of the "knowledge or consent" language of
§ 881 (a) (7) in United States v. 141st Street Corp.3' In 141st Street, the Second
Circuit concluded that "a claimant may avoid forfeiture by establishing
either that he had no knowledge of the narcotics activity or, if he had knowl-
edge, that he did not consent to it."3 2 The government in this case sought
forfeiture of an apartment building used to facilitate narcotics distribu-
tion.33 The owner of the building, however, claimed that he did not know
of the tenant's drug activity and that he never consented to such activity. 34
Therefore, the owner argued that because he was an "innocent owner,"
the property was not subject to forfeiture under § 881 (a) (7).35
Defense: United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993), 16 HARv.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 835 (1993) (same).
30. See United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1452 n.9 (acknowl-
edging that before 92 Buena Vista Avenue, a post-illegal-act transferee's interest in
the property was "automatically eradicated because title vested in the government
on the date of the illegal act"). For an explanation of the term "post-illegal-act
transferee," see text accompanying infra note 45.
31. 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); see
Gurule, supra note 2, at 169 (acknowledging Second Circuit's adoption of disjunc-
tive interpretation of "knowledge or consent" language in pre-92 Buena Vista Ave-
nue opinion).
32. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit,
noting that courts that have addressed this issue were divided in their approaches,
ultimately decided to adopt the disjunctive approach. Id. at 877-78. For a discus-
sion of the Second Circuit's analysis of this issue, see infra notes 33-43 and accom-
panying text.
33. Id. at 872. The common areas of the building in question were littered
with crack vials and crack pipes. Id. at 873. "Lookouts" were posted around the
building, and "steerers," who directed potential drug purchasers to the area where
the drugs were located, loitered near the building and in the lobby. Id.
34. Id. at 879. The owner claimed that he only learned of the drug activity, at
the time of a police raid, and after the raid he instructed the building superinten-
dent not to accept rent from the tenants who had been arrested on drug charges.
Id. Despite the claimant's assertion that he did not know of the drug activity, the
jury concluded that either the owner knew of the drug activity at an earlier time
and took no steps to stop it, or that the owner's response was inadequate to assert
an innocent owner defense based on lack of consent. Id. at 879-80. For a discus-
sion of how the Second Circuit interpreted the consent element of the statute, see
infra note 40.
35. Id. at 876.
730 [Vol. 40: p. 723
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss3/9
1995] NOTE 731
In its analysis, the court noted the confusing nature of the language
of § 881 (a) (7).36 The court resolved the confusion by relying on the "or-
dinary meaning of the word 'consent.' ,,37 In doing so, the court found
that the "ordinary meaning" of consent is one party's "compliance or ap-
proval" of another party's actions or proposals. 38 This definition of con-
sent led the Second Circuit to determine that a disjunctive interpretation
of "or" was correct.3 9 The court reasoned that a claimant must prove
either lack of knowledge or lack of consent; otherwise, the "consent" lan-
guage would be mere surplusage because the notion of consent necessarily
assumes that a claimant has knowledge. 40 The court noted that if knowl-
edge alone precluded the owner from asserting the "innocent owner" de-
fense-as would be the case under a conjunctive interpretation where the
claimant would have to disprove knowledge and consent-the consent lan-
guage would be surplusage. 41 Although Congress intended forfeiture to
36. Id. at 878. The court maintained that the plain language of § 881 (a) (7) is
"at best, confusing." Id. On the one hand, the court reasoned that Congress' use
of the "disjunctive 'or' suggests that a claimant should succeed by establishing
either lack of knowledge or lack of consent." Id. On the other hand, the court
acknowledged that Congress' use of the word "without," before the pertinent lan-
guage "knowledge or consent," could be interpreted to mean that an innocent
owner must be without both knowledge and consent. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. More specifically, the court looked to WEBSTER'S THRn NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY which defined consent as "compliance or approval espe [cially]
of what is done or proposed by another." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 482 (1971)).
39. Id.
40. Id. The court engaged in the following analysis:
[I)n order to consent to drug activity, one must know of it. If we were to
construe section 881(a)(7) to mean that a claimant's knowledge alone
precludes the innocent owner defense (i.e., that a claimant must disprove
both knowledge and consent), then "consent" as used in the statute
would be totally unnecessary. In other words, the factfinder would never
reach the issue of consent once it concluded that the claimant had knowl-
edge. Similarly, under this construction it would be necessary to deter-
mine whether the claimant consented only if the factfinder first
concluded that the claimant did not have knowledge of the drug activity, a
result that cannot be squared with the ordinary meaning of the word
"consent."
Id.
Aside from relying on the ordinary meaning of the word consent, the Second
Circuit also addressed what actions constituted consent. Id. at 878-79. The court
defined consent in § 881 (a) (7) as "the failure to take all reasonable steps to pre-
vent illicit use of premises once one acquires knowledge of that use." Id. at 879
(adopting Supreme Court definition of consent from Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)); see Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 224-27 (dis-
cussing Supreme Court's analysis in Calero-Toledo). Applying this meaning of con-
sent, the court affirmed the jury's determination that the claimant in 141st Street
Corp. did not take all reasonable steps to prevent the narcotics trafficking in the
building. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879. Given the evidence presented at trial,
the court concluded that the jury's conclusion was more than supported by the
evidence. Id. For a discussion of the steps claimant took, see supra note 34.
41. 141st St. Corp., 911 F. 2d at 878.
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be a powerful tool in combatting the war on drugs,4 2 the Second Circuit
noted that the inclusion of an express defense in the statute indicated
Congress' desire for innocent owners not to lose their property.43
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit has adopted varying approaches to the "innocent
owner" defense depending upon the particular facts of the case.4 4 The
Eleventh Circuit distinguishes between pre-illegal-act owners, those who
acquired an interest in the property before the illegal drug activity oc-
curred, and post-illegal-act transferees, those who acquired an interest in
the property after the drug activity occurred. 45 Although the Eleventh
Circuit is apparently split as to which interpretation to apply to pre-illegal-
act owners-in some cases applying the disjunctive approach 46 and in
some cases applying the conjunctive approach 47 -the court has been uni-
form in its approach to post-illegal-act transferees.
48
42. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 191-92 (1984), riprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3374-75); see Blacher, supra note 2, at 503 ("Congress
has determined that the best way to combat illegal trafficking is to remove the
incentive by stripping the profits from the drug dealers through asset forfeiture.");
Champoux, supra note 2, at 247 (stating that Congress enacted § 881 in "an at-
tempt to increase the penalties for felony drug violations" and that § 881(a) (7)
"represents an attempt to further solidify and strengthen drug forfeiture provi-
sions" (citing Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1837 (1984))); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 521 (stating that "asset forfeiture has
become a potent and effective means of combating ... drug trafficking").
43. Id.; see Dunne, supra note 11, at 81 (acknowledging that "potent" forfei-
ture provision of § 881 "carves out an exception to its broad reach").
44. Compare United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1503
(11th Cir. 1992) (allowing pre-illegal-act transferee to avoid forfeiture by proving
either lack of knowledge or lack of consent) with United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th
St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1453 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that under § 881 (a) (7) "lack of
consent" defense is not available to post-illegal-act transferees); United States v.
6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding in case
involving mortgagee claimant that " '[i]nnocent owners are those who have no
knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the illegal activi-
ties'" (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d
976, 981 (11th Cir.))) and 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d at 981 (holding that
"[i]nnocent owners are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and
who have not consented to the illegal activities" in case involving forfeiture of co-
owners interest in property purchased with another's drug proceeds) (emphasis
added). For a discussion of the distinction between pre-illegal-act owners and post-
illegal-act transferees, see text accompanying infra note 45.
45. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 169-70 (acknowledging that Eleventh Circuit
has differing interpretations of "knowledge or consent" language depending on
whether claimant is pre-illegal-act owner or post-illegal-act transferee). For exam-
ples of Eleventh Circuit cases that have distinguished between pre-illegal-act own-
ers and post-illegal-act transferees, see supra note 44.
46. See 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1503. For a further discussion of
1012 Germantown Road, see infra note 48.
47. See 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d at 1561; 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d at
981. For a further discussion of 6960 Miraflores Avenue and 15603 85th Avenue, see
infra note 48.
48. See 6640 S.W 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448 at 1452-53 (noting that "[b]ecause the
apparent intra-circuit split involves the appropriate interpretation for pre-illegal
732 [Vol. 40: p. 723
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The Eleventh Circuit adopted its approach to the "knowledge or con-
sent" language with respect to post-illegal-act transferees in United States v.
6640 S. W 48th Street.49 6640 S. W. 48th Street involved the forfeiture of
property purchased by Maria Mendicuti and Reinaldo Luis as joint ten-
ants. 50 In April of 1990, a United States Customs Agent received informa-
tion that implicated Luis in a drug-smuggling operation.5 1 From May to
July of 1990, informants alleged that Luis held meetings at the defendant
property to finalize various plans with regard to the smuggling scheme.
52
Luis was arrested at the defendant property on September 7, 1990, and
retained appellantJose Larraz as legal counsel.5 3 On September 12, 1990,
Luis transferred his interest in the property to Mendicuti in exchange for
ten dollars.54 Subsequently, Mendicuti executed a $50,000 promissory
note and a mortgage deed on the property in favor of Larraz to satisfy
Luis' legal fees. 55 On March 5, 1991, the United States filed a civil forfei-
ture action against the defendant property pursuant to § 881(a) (7).56
Larraz then filed a claim on the property on May 24, 1991 alleging that he
was entitled to a lien that was superior to the government's as well as
claiming an "innocent owner" defense arising from the innocent owner-
ship status of Mendicuti.5 7
In 6640 S.W. 48th Street, the Eleventh Circuit held that the "lack of
consent" defense is not available to post-illegal-act transferees under
act owners, we need not resolve it in this case" and stating that lack of consent
defense of § 881(a) (7) is not available to post-illegal-act transferees).
The Eleventh Circuit is split with regard to how to interpret § 881(a) (6) and
(7) in cases of pre-illegal-act transferees. In United States v. 1012 Germantown Road,
the court adopted a disjunctive interpretation of the "knowledge or consent" lan-
guage of § 881 (a) (7), stating that a claimant can prove either lack of knowledge or
consent to prevail. 963 F.2d at 1503 & n.3. In 1012 Germantown Road, a store
owner, with knowledge of drug activity occurring on and around his property, as-
serted an "innocent owner" defense based on his lack of consent to such activity.
Id. at 1504. The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case after determining that the
district court incorrectly instructed the jury as to the definition of consent. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit decided that the claimant should be entitled to prevail upon
establishing lack of consent, even though he had knowledge of the illegal activity.
Id. at 1503.
In two other cases, however, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "'[i] nnocent owners
are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not con-
sented to the illegal activities.'" 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d at 1561 (emphasis
added) (quoting 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d at 981).
49. 41 F.3d 1448 (11th Cir. 1995).
50. Id. at 1450.
51. Id.
52. Id. In August, Luis offered $15,000 as a cash deposit to the informants for
their participation in drug smuggling. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Luis and Mendicuti did not file claims on the property and a default
judgment was entered against them. Id.
57. Id.
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§ 881 (a) (7) when such transferees had knowledge of the illegal activity. 58
When the claimant conceded knowledge of his predecessor-in-interest's
illegal activity at the time the predecessor transferred the property interest
to him, the court applied a conjunctive interpretation to § 881 (a) (7)'s "in-
nocent owner" defense, holding that the claimant must establish lack of
knowledge as well as lack of consent to prevail.5 9
Because the claimant conceded knowledge of the illegal activity when
he received an interest in the property, the court addressed the claimant's
assertion that he still qualified as an "innocent owner" because he did not
consent to the illegal activity.60 The Eleventh Circuit decided that the
"lack of consent" defense of § 881 (a) (7) is not available to post-illegal-act
transferees. 61 The court reasoned that such an interpretation was neces-
sary to avoid an absurd result.62 If it allowed a post-illegal-act transferee to
assert a "lack of consent" defense, the claimant would be successful every
time because, by definition, such a claimant has no opportunity to consent
to the illegal activity involving property he or she did not own.63 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the policy behind § 881 (a) (7) and norms
58. Id. at 1453; see Gurule, supra note 2, at 169-70 (acknowledging that Elev-
enth Circuit's interpretation did not allow post-illegal-act transferees to prevail
upon establishing lack of consent).
59. 41 F.3d at 1453. The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis in 6640 S.W 48th
Street by noting that in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126
(1993), a plurality of the Supreme Court stated that title in forfeitable property did
not vest in the government until the time of forfeiture, thus allowing post-illegal-
act transferees the possibility of asserting an "innocent owner" defense. Id. at 1451
(citing 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1137). The Eleventh Circuit also noted
that the Supreme Court in 92 Buena Vista Avenue, did not decide whether a court
should examine the owner's knowledge at the time of the transfer or at the time of
the illegal act. Id. The Eleventh Circuit answered this question in 6640 S. W 48th
Street, and stated that the knowledge element of the "innocent owner" defense re-
fers to knowledge at the time the owner acquired the interest in the property,
instead of at the time of the illegal activity. Id. at 1452. In deciding this issue, the
Eleventh Circuit relied on its prior decision in United States v. 6960 Miraflores
Avenue, 995 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993), where the court suggested that it should
look to knowledge at the time of the transfer and not at the time of the illegal act.
Id. (citing 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d at 1564).
60. 41 F.3d at 1452.
61. Id. at 1453. The Eleventh Circuit noted the circuit split on the issue and
decided to use a conjunctive approach in interpreting the "without knowledge or
consent" language of § 881 (a) (7) as applied to post-illegal-act transferees. Id. at
1452-53. The court acknowledged that its two options were to interpret the statute
"disjunctively, to afford the defense if the transferee either was without knowledge
or did not consent, or conjunctively, to afford the defense only when the trans-
feree was without knowledge and did not consent." Id. at 1452. For a discussion of
the holdings of the various circuit courts, see supra notes 31-43 and accompanying
text and infra notes 65-85, 94-153 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 1452; see Gurule, supra note 2, at 172 (explaining that consent re-
quirement is meaningless as applied to post-illegal-act transferee because prior to
acquiring property, post-illegal-act transferee has no interest in or control over
property and therefore is in no position to withhold consent).
63. 41 F.3d at 1452. This result would be true regardless of the claimant's
later-acquired knowledge of the activity. Id.
734 [Vol. 40: p. 723
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of statutory construction warranted its adoption of the conjunctive ap-
proach to the "knowledge or consent" language of § 881 (a) (7) in cases of
post-illegal-act transferees. 64
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Lot 111-B,65 joins the Eleventh Circuit in 6640 S. W. 48th Street by
adopting a conjunctive reading of the "knowledge or consent" language of
§ 881 (a) (7) in a case involving a pre-illegal-act owner.66 In Lot 111-B, the
claimant sought return of property that was forfeited pursuant to
§ 881 (a) (7) .67 The claimant argued that even if he was aware of the illegal
activity occurring on the property, he should prevail if he could prove that
he did not consent to the illegal activity.6 8 The Ninth Circuit, however,
disagreed with the claimant and, relying upon the legislative history of the
statute, determined that Congress intended a conjunctive meaning of the
word "or."6 9 The legislative history provided" 'the property would not be
subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such property knew or consented
64. Id. at 1452-53. The court described § 881 (a) (7) "as reflecting 'two interre-
lated aims of Congress: to punish criminals while ensuring that innocent persons
are not penalized for their unwitting association with wrongdoers.'" Id. at 1452
(quoting United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1500 (11th Cir.
1992)). Furthermore, the court noted that it must interpret § 881 (a) (7) to give it
a logical meaning not "at odds" with the purpose. Id. The court stated: "We are
obligated to construe the provision to avoid an absurd result if another interpreta-
tion is more consistent with Section 881 (a) (7)'s purpose." Id. (citations omitted).
The court concluded that "[a]llowing post-illegal act transferees who knowingly
take an interest in forfeitable property an innocent owner defense because they
were not on the scene early enough to consent to the illegal activity would not
serve this purpose and would be an absurd construction of the statute." Id.
65. 902 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (pre-92 Buena Vista Avenue
opinion).
66. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d at 1445. Lot 111-B involved a claim for the return of
property forfeited under § 881 (a) (7). Id. at 1444. In a per curiam opinion, the
Ninth Circuit first affirmed the district court's finding that the claimant was a
"nominal owner" lacking standing to challenge the forfeiture. Id. at 1444-45. The
claimant owned a 41.65% interest in the property, yet presented little evidence to
prove that he was more than a nominal owner. Id. The Ninth Circuit also af-
firmed the district court's alternative holding that the claimant did not qualify as
an "innocent owner" because he was aware of the illegal activities occurring on the
property. Id. at 1445. The court rejected the claimant's argument that even
though he knew about the illegal activity, he was still an innocent owner because
he did not consent to it. Id.
67. Id. at 1444.
68. Id. at 1445.
69. See id. The Ninth Circuit relied on a Joint House-Senate Explanation of
the amendment adding § 881 (a) (6). See id.; Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles
II and III of the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, 124 CONG. REc. 34,670
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 9518 [hereinafter Joint Explanatory State-
ment]. This Joint Explanatory Statement explained that forfeiture is of a penal
nature and further reviewed that an innocent owner's property should not be for-
feited. Id.
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to the [illegal conduct].' ,,70 From this statement, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that if the claimant "either knew or consented" to the illegal activi-
ties, the "innocent owner" defense is not available. 71 The claimant had
knowledge of the illegal activities, and therefore, the court did not allow
the claimant to assert an "innocent owner" defense because he could not
establish both lack of knowledge and lack of consent.72
B. The Third Circuit's Approach to the Innocent Owner Defense Under
§ 881(a)(6) and (7)
Before examining the precise issue the Third Circuit addressed in
United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, it is important to understand the con-
text in which that issue arose. The Third Circuit focused its analysis in One
1973 Rolls Royce on the seminal case United States v. 6109 Grubb Road.73
6109 Grubb Road involved a civil forfeiture of two parcels of property pur-
suant to § 881 (a) (7).74 The claimant's husband had used both parcels of
70. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d at 1445 (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement, supra
note 69, 124 CONG. REc. 34,670, 34,671 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
9518, 9522-23).
71. Id. (emphasis omitted). The court acknowledged that the purpose of the
forfeiture provision is to seize all property that has a "substantial connection" to
the illegal activity. Id. The court reasoned that this policy would be undercut if
claimants who had knowledge of the illegal drug activity were allowed to assert an
"innocent owner" defense. Id.72. See id. at 1445; see also United States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle, 9 F.3d 74, 76(9th Cir. 1993) (stating that as applied to post-illegal-act transferee, § 881(a) (6)
bars claimant from prevailing if he or she had knowledge of the origin of the
property). In 10936 Oak Run Circle, Eddie Edwards purchased the defendant prop-
erty on January 5, 1987. Id. at 75. Edwards was identified as a member of an
organization that distributed cocaine and PCP. Id. Edwards was said to have no
legitimate source of income and to have made the payments on the property from
the sale of narcotics. Id. The claimants asserted that, in forgiveness of a debt that
Edwards owed them, Edwards transferred the property to the claimants. Id. The
claimants asserted in their affidavits that this agreement to forgive the debt took
place on May 18, 1990. Id. The claimants moved into the property on July 19,
1990; the government served a warrant on the property on July 20, 1990; Edwards
executed a deed to the property in favor of the claimants on August 6, 1990; the
deed was recorded on August 8, 1990; and the claimants asserted a claim to the
property as innocent owners on August 8, 1990. Id. The Ninth Circuit vacated the
district court's judgment of forfeiture and remanded the case to determine if the
claimants had "knowledge of the origin of the property in drug proceeds." Id. at
76. The court explained that this knowledge includes such that "puts the owner
on notice that he [or she] should inquire further." Id. Finally, the court stated
that "innocence is incompatible with knowledge," thereby applying a conjunctive
interpretation to the "knowledge or consent" language of § 881 (a) (6). Id.
73. 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989).
74. Id. at 620. In 6109 Grubb Road, the government filed civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings under § 881 (a) (7), seeking to have two parcels of real property seized
and forfeited. Id. The claimant, Jane DiLoreto, resided at the Grubb Road loca-
tion with her husband Richard and their five children. Id. The government insti-
tuted forfeiture proceedings after an investigation disclosed that Richard DiLoreto
used both parcels to further the trafficking of illegal narcotics. Id. The proceed-
ings were stayed pending the outcome of Richard's trial. Id. Richard was con-
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property to further the trafficking of illegal substances. 75 Despite possess-
ing an ownership interest in the property at the time of the illegal transac-
tion and conceding that probable cause existed to believe that the
premises had been used to commit or facilitate narcotics violations, the
claimant contended that she neither had knowledge nor consented to the
use of the property for facilitating drug violations.76 The district court
concluded that she did not prove that she had no knowledge of her hus-
band's drug activities. 77 Therefore, the court had to decide whether Con-
gress intended for knowledge alone to be sufficient to lose the "innocent
owner" defense or whether the claimant could demonstrate that even if
she had knowledge, she did not consent to the illegal activities, thus enti-
ling her to the "innocent owner" defense. 78
In deciding this issue, the Third Circuit examined the legislative his-
tory of § 881 (a) (6) because the legislative history of § 881 (a) (7) was
"sparse."79 The court specifically noted that Congress had stated, " ' [d]ue
to the penal nature of forfeiture statutes, it is the intent of these provisions
that property would be forfeited only if there is a substantial connection
between the property and the underlying criminal activity which the stat-
ute seeks to prevent.' ",80 The court also examined the language of the
statute relying on the canons of statutory construction that require the
victed of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and distributing
cocaine, using the telephone to facilitate the conspiracy, and failing to report in-
come received from the sale of the cocaine. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Pursuant to the forfeiture provisions of § 881, the court will order
forfeiture once the government establishes probable cause unless the claimant es-
tablishes innocent ownership. Id. at 623.
77. Id. at 623. The Third Circuit found that the district court improperly re-
lied on hearsay depositions in determining that the claimant could not prove that
she lacked knowledge of the illegal activities. Id. Ultimately, the Third Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to determine if the claimant could prove
her innocent ownership by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
78. Id. at 623-24.
79. Id. at 624-25. In resolving this issue of first impression, the court noted
that the legislative history of § 881 (a) (7) referred to § 881 (a) (6) and therefore it
was appropriate to look to § 881 (a) (6)'s legislative history. Id. For a further dis-
cussion of the legislative history of § 881, see supra notes 1, 5, 7 and infra notes 80,
104, 115 accompanying text.
80. Id. at 625 (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement supra note 69, 124 CONG.
REc. 34,670, 34,671 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522). The Third
Circuit also noted that the same report stated, " 'the property would not be subject
to forfeiture unless the owner of such property knew or consented to the fact that
[the property was related to illegal drug transactions].' " Id. at 625 n.4 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). Although this statement suggests that property would
be subject to forfeiture if the owner knew (without consenting) that the property
was related to drug transactions, the court did not appear to consider this factor in
its analysis. See 124 CONG. Rjc. 34,670, 34,672 (1978). In contrast to the Third
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit relied on the same statement in United States v. Lot 111-
B, 902 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and concluded that a conjunctive
approach was appropriate. Id. at 1445. For a further discussion of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's analysis, see supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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court to give effect to every word.8 1 Finally, the Third Circuit looked to
precedent and found that only one other district court had addressed
whether the "knowledge or consent" phrase in § 881 (a) (7) established in-
dependent defenses. 82 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in United States v. 171-02 Liberty Avenues 3 concluded
that the statute's language rendered two defenses, either lack of knowledge
or lack of consent. 84 Based on its findings, the Third Circuit, adopting a
The Third Circuit also acknowledged the remarks of two Senators with regard
to the amendment to § 881 (a) (6). 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625. Senator Nunn
noted that Congress added the innocent owner provision " 'to make it clear that a
bona fide party who has no knowledge or consent to the property he owns having
been derived from an illegal transaction, that party would be able to establish that
fact under this amendment and forfeiture would not occur.' " Id. at 625 (quoting
124 CONG. REc. 23,057 (1978)). Additionally, the court noted Senator Culver's
statement:
[TIhe original language could have been construed to reach properties
traceable to the illegal proceeds but obtained by an innocent party with-
out knowledge of the manner in which the proceeds were obtained. The
original language is modified in the proposed amendment in order to
protect the individual who obtains ownership of proceeds with no knowl-
edge of the illegal transaction.
Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 23,056 (1978)).
81. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625-26. The court explained that "'in con-
struing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used.' " Id. (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)); see 2A
NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 119-20 (5th
ed. 1992) (" 'It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if
possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.' A statute should be con-
strued so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative
or superfluous, void or insignificant .. ") (footnotes omitted). Moreover, canons
of statutory construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive
must be given their separate meanings unless the context dictates otherwise. 6109
Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626 (citing Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339); see IA NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.14, at 129 (5th ed. 1993) ("[T]he dis-
junctive 'or' usually . . . separates words or phrases in the alternate relation-
ship .. "). But see id. ("[H]owever, the word ['or'] can be interpreted as a
conjunctive in a given context.... [I]t is important not to read the word 'or' too
strictly, where to do so would render the language of the statute dubious.") (foot-
notes omitted).
82. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626. The court cited United States v. 171-02
Liberty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626.
Liberty Avenue involved a civil forfeiture proceeding against property in a high
drug-trafficking area. Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 47. The owner of the property
conceded that he had knowledge of drug trafficking on his property, yet argued
that he could assert an "innocent owner" defense by establishing that he did not
consent to such activity. Id. at 49. The court analyzed the statute under the ca-
nons of statutory construction and adopted a disjunctive interpretation of Con-
gress' use of the word "or." Id. at 50. The disjunctive interpretation gave the words
separated by "or" independent meaning. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Liberty
Avenue court concluded that the statute created an affirmative defense where the
illegal acts giving rise to the forfeiture transpired "without the knowledge or without
the consent of the owner." Id. at 50.
83. 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
84. Id. at 50. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see supra note 82.
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disjunctive approach, concluded that a claimant can establish innocent
ownership by proving that the illegal use of the property occurred either
without her knowledge or without her consent.8 5
C. Approaches to § 881(a)(4)(C)
At the time the Third Circuit addressed the proper interpretation of
the "innocent owner" defense of § 881 (a) (4) (C), no other circuit court,
including the Third Circuit, had expressly confronted the proper interpre-
tation of "or" as used in this section.8 6 Several district courts, however,
had evaluated the "innocent owner" defense under § 881 (a) (4) (C). For
example, in United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera 911,8 7 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas held that under
§ 881 (a) (4) (C), the claimant has the "burden of establishing that he had
no knowledge and was not willfully blind to the fact that the [vehicle] was
used to facilitate the sale of controlled substances," thereby adopting a
conjunctive interpretation of § 881(a) (4) (C). 88 The court reasoned that
" '[t] he purpose of the willful blindness theory is to impose criminal liabil-
ity on people who, recognizing the likelihood of wrongdoing, nonetheless
consciously refuse to take basic investigatory steps.' "89 In 1977Porsche Car-
rera 911, the claimant was a criminal defense lawyer asserting an ownership
85. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626. Several commentators have agreed with
this disjunctive interpretation of the "knowledge or consent" language of
§ 881(a)(6). See Dunne, supra note 11, at 85 ("knowledge and consent must re-
ceive independent consideration"); Loomba, supra note 11, at 492 (advocating dis-
junctive interpretation and stating "failure to establish 'lack of knowledge'
[should] not preclude a claimant from innocent owner status"); O'Brien, supra
note 2, at 550 (advancing disjunctive approach and "requirement that the owner
show he [or she] took 'some overt action' against the illegal activity in order to
establish a lack of consent"). But see Blacher, supra note 2, at 503 (arguing that
appropriate interpretation is that claimants must prove lack of knowledge and lack
of consent to prevail under "innocent owner" defense).
86. See United States v. One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir.
1992). In United States v. One 1989Jeep Wagoneer, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit expressly declined to decide whether a claimant must
prove lack of knowledge and lack of consent to prevail under an "innocent owner"
defense of § 881(a)(4)(C). Id. at 1174 n.1. Because the government conceded
that the claimant lacked knowledge and did not raise an issue as to consent, the
court found that there was only an issue as to the "willful blindness" of the claim-
ant. Id. The court "believe [d] that the concept of willful blindness presupposes
the absence of knowledge and consent." Id. The opinion focused on the appro-
priate standard for determining whether a claimant is "willfully blind," and did not
engage in the debate between the disjunctive or conjunctive interpretation of
§ 881 (a) (4) (C). Id. at 1174-76.
87. 748 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
88. Id. at 1185 (emphasis added); see United States v. One 1988 Honda Ac-
cord, 735 F. Supp. 726, 730 (E.D. Mich 1990) (stating that even if claimant did not
have knowledge of illegal use of vehicle, claimant was willfully blind with respect to
that illegal use and, therefore, vehicle was forfeited under § 881 (a) (4) (C)).
89. 1977 Porsche Carrera, 748 F. Supp. at 1185 (citations omitted).
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interest in the vehicle as partial satisfaction of legal fees.90 The court con-
cluded that even if the claimant did not have actual knowledge at the time
he contracted to receive the car, he was subsequently willfully blind be-
cause he did not investigate thereafter into the origin of the vehicle.9 1 On
the other hand, in United States v. A Single Story Double Wide Trailer,92 the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware stated: "[The
claimant] bears the burden of pleading facts that, if proven at trial, would
show that if the trailer were used for illicit purposes, it was without his
knowledge or without his consent," thereby adopting a disjunctive inter-
pretation of § 881 (a) (4) (C).93
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT APPROACH TO INTERPRETING THE INNOCENT
OWNER DEFENSE OF § 881 (a) (4) (C)
A. Facts: United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce
The Third Circuit, for the first time, interpreted § 881 (a) (4) (C) and
its "willful blindness" provision in United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce.
94
The case arose when the government seized attorney Oscar B. Goodman's
Rolls Royce automobile. 95 Nicodemo Scarfo, Sr., a co-defendant of one of
Goodman's former clients, gave the car to Goodman as reimbursement
for the $16,000 that Goodman paid to the Four Seasons Hotel in Philadel-
90. Id. at 1182. The claimant had received the automobile from a client in
partial payment for legal services the claimant rendered on behalf of the previous
owner of the automobile. Id. at 1182. The previous owner had been arrested and
charged with serious drug offenses. Id.
91. Id. at 1185-86. The court noted that the claimant "at least had the respon-
sibility to take the basic investigatory steps necessary to determine that his fees
were not being satisfied with a major instrumentality of the crime charged against
his client." Id. at 1186.
92. 727 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del. 1989).
93. Id. at 152 (emphasis added). In A Single Story Double Wide Trailer, the
claimant, Charles Peterson, sought to have set aside an order of default judgment
and decree of forfeiture entered against the defendant property. Id. at 150-51.
The initial complaint alleged that the defendant property "either constituted pro-
ceeds traceable to or was intended to facilitate illegal drug transactions conducted
by Eric Batson." Id. at 150. Batson, however, stated that the trailer belonged to
Peterson. Id. Peterson accepted a service of summons and complaint concerning
the trailer, yet he never responded to any requests from the government. Id. at
151. Subsequently, the default judgment was entered. Id. In response to the
claimant's argument that the default judgment should be set aside, the court ac-
knowledged that it had discretion to do so if, inter alia, the claimant has a meritori-
ous defense. Id. In this context, the court explained that to prevail, Peterson
would have to be able to prove at trial that the trailer was used without his knowl-
edge or without his consent. Id. The court found that Peterson had failed to meet
his burden of establishing the existence of a meritorious defense and denied the
claimant's motion. Id. at 152, 155.
94. 43 F.3d 794 (3d Cir. 1994). This was a case of first impression for the
Third Circuit. Id. For a discussion of how the other circuit courts addressed
§ 881 (a) (4) (C), see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 799. Oscar B. Goodman is a criminal defense attorney who has rep-
resented clients throughout the country. Id.
740 [Vol. 40: p. 723
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phia for a party given by Scarfo's son.96 The party was in celebration of
Scarfo, Sr.'s acquittal at a murder trial in which Goodman was one of the
defense counsel.97 Subsequently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) seized the Rolls Royce pursuant to § 881 (a) (4), asserting that mem-
bers of the Scarfo family used the vehicle to transport people to and from
meetings related to the Scarfo family's drug distribution activities. 9 8 Ac-
cordingly, Goodman filed a claim asserting the "innocent owner" defense
pursuant to § 881(a) (4) (C) .9 9 Goodman alleged that he did not know
about, did not consent to, and was not willfully blind to the car's use in
drug transactions.10 0
B. District Court Analysis
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania found that Goodman did not prove lack of willful blindness and
that alone was "sufficient to defeat his claim of innocent ownership" under
§ 881 (a) (4) (C).11 The district court first examined the meaning of "will-
96. Id. Nicodemo Scarfo, Sr., the one time reputed head of the Philadelphia
branch of La Cosa Nostra (LCN), purchased the car in January of 1986. Id. at 799,
802. He registered the car in Florida to Anthony Gregorio, an associate of Scarfo
who lived in Fort Lauderdale. Id. at 802.
97. Id. at 799.
98. Id. at 799-800. The relevant language of § 881 (a) (4) provides for forfei-
ture for "[a] 11 conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used,
or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph
(1), (2), or (9) .... 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (1988).
The Rolls Royce was subject to forfeiture under § 881 (a) (4) because the vehi-
cle "was used on two occasions to facilitate drug trafficking." One 1973 Rolls Royce,
43 F.3d at 802. The first occasion was in early 1986 when Gregorio drove Scarfo
and others to meet a drug dealer from Philadelphia involved in trafficking a raw
material used to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. At that first meeting, the
Philadelphia drug dealer promised to pay Scarfo $200,000 in "street taxes" so that
Scarfo would not interfere with his drug operation. Id. The second occasion was
in August of 1986 when Scarfo called a meeting of his LCN family members in Fort
Lauderdale. Id. Gregorio used the vehicle to pick up a member of the Scarfo LCN
family from the airport. Id. The family member brought $50,000 in "street taxes"
from drug trafficking in Philadelphia. Id.
In 1987, the government initiated a series of prosecutions relating to the
Scarfo family. Id. Goodman was involved as counsel, representing one of the co-
defendants who was accused of engaging in an extortion scheme. Id. During that
trial, Goodman forced a key witness to admit that the Scarfo family engaged in
drug trafficking. Id.
99. One 1973 Rolls Royce 43 F.3d at 800. For the relevant text of
§ 881(a) (4) (C) providing for the "innocent owner" defense, see infra note 100.
100. Id. Section 881 (a) (4) (C), the basis for which Goodman asserted his "in-
nocent owner" defense provides that "no conveyance shall be forfeited under this
paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omis-
sion established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) (C)
(1988).
101. United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 817 F. Supp. 571, 572 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
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ful blindness," as used in § 881 (a) (4) (C), in light of other courts' interpre-
tations and in light of Congress' intent.10 2 The district court stated: "Lack
of willful blindness sufficient to prevail as an innocent owner under
§ 881 (a) (4) (C) means that a claimant must show that he or she has not
ignored a signal or suggestion that a vehicle might have been used to facil-
itate the trafficking of illegal drugs."' 0 3 The court found that its defini-
tion of "willful blindness" comported with Congress' intent in using that
language in § 881 (a) (4) (C). 10 4 The court also acknowledged that its in-
terpretation of "willful blindness" corresponded with the historical use of
forfeiture generally. 10 5 Pursuant to its interpretation of "willful blind-
ness," the court concluded that Goodman did not prove that he was will-
fully blind.1 0 6
Next, the district court questioned whether, after failing to establish
lack of willful blindness, Goodman lost his "innocent owner" status or
whether he had a "second bite at the apple" by trying to establish either
102. Id. at 578-79.
103. Id. at 578; accord United States v. One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d
1172, 1175 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[W]illful blindness involves an owner who deliber-
ately closes his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious and whose acts or
omissions show a conscious purpose to avoid knowing the truth."); United States v.
1977 Porsche Carrera 911, 748 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (stating that
under willful blindness standard, attorney claimant "at least has the responsibility
to take the basic investigatory steps necessary to determine that his fees were not
being satisfied with a major instrumentality of the crime charged against his cli-
ent"). For a further discussion of United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera 911, see supra
notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
104. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 817 F. Supp. at 578. The court noted that the bill
was initially introduced in the House of Representatives without the willful blind-
ness language, but members of Congress thought that the section " 'would lead to
a 'look-the-other-way' defense.' " Id. (quoting 134 CONG. REc. 24,086 (1988)
(statement of Rep. Archer)). The court recognized that this possibility led to the
addition of the willful blindness language. Id. Representative Young described the
additional "willful blindness" language as " 'address[ing] the cases of individuals
who have demonstrated a conscious purpose to avoid the truth.' " Id. (quoting 134
CONG. REC. 33,288 (1988)). Additionally, Representative Jones stated: " '[T]hese
provisions will provide significant legal rights for the innocent, but still ensure that
the guilty will be punished.'" Id. (quoting 134 CONG. REc 33,313 (1988)).
105. Id. (recognizing that from colonial times until recently, common law al-
lowed forfeiture of property used in commission of crimes and no defense existed
for innocent owners). The court further explained that its interpretation of the
"willful blindness" language "does the least offense to a protection that would-be
innocent owners historically did not enjoy at common law." Id. at 579. For a list of
commentaries discussing the history of forfeiture, see supra note 2.
106. Id. at 579. The court noted that Goodman was involved in the federal
drug trial in 1987 of Scarfo, Sr. and others. Id. The court stated that although that
case ended in an acquittal, "that does not prevent Mr. Goodman from being on
notice to the possibility of the use of the Rolls Royce to facilitate drug trafficking."
Id. The court further explained that the 1987 federal trial, combined with infor-
mation elicited by Goodman during cross examination regarding the LCN's in-
volvement in drug trafficking in another trial, led to the court's conclusion that
Goodman failed to meet his burden of proving lack of willful blindness. Id. at 580-
81.
[Vol. 40: p. 723
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lack of knowledge or lack of consent. 10 7 Although the court recognized
that 6109 Grubb Road would allow a claimant to prevail by establishing
either lack of knowledge or lack of consent, the court concluded that 6109
Grubb Road did not apply to Goodman's case.10 8 First, the court acknowl-
edged that 6109 Grubb Road interpreted § 881 (a) (7), which lacked the will-
ful blindness language, whereas the case at bar involved § 881 (a) (4) (C),
which specifically included the "willful blindness" language. 10 9 The court
recognized: "The additional words 'willful blindness' cannot be given ef-
fect if the innocent ownership defense of § 881 (a) (4) (C) is interpreted
the way the Third Circuit interpreted the real property innocent owner-
ship defense of § 881 (a) (7) in 6109 Grubb Road."110 Therefore, the court
concluded that § 881 (a) (4) (C) requires that once a claimant fails to prove
a lack of willful blindness, the claimant can no longer prevail as an inno-
cent owner.' 
11
C. The Third Circuit's Analysis of the Proper Interpretation of § 881(a)(4)(C).
Goodman's appeal presented two issues to the Third Circuit. First,
the Third Circuit had to construe § 881 (a) (4) (C)'s "willful blindness" lan-
guage. 112 Second, the Third Circuit had to decide whether a claimant
could obtain relief under the "innocent owner" defense notwithstanding a
107. Id. at 580.
108. Id. For a further discussion of 6109 Grubb Road, see supra notes 73-85
and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 581. The court explained that if it were to interpret
§ 881 (a) (4) (C) in the disjunctive, then the "willful blindness" language would rep-
resent "nothing more than a useless third bite at the apple." Id. Additionally, the
court reasoned that Congress "surely" did not intend to add a more stringent stan-
dard of lack of guilty knowledge to a provision that already allowed a claimant to
prevail by satisfying one of two lesser standards. Id.
111. Id.
112. United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 806-12 (3d Cir.
1994). The Third Circuit adopted the definition of willful blindness that it had
previously set forth in United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985).
One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 808-09. Caminos involved a defendant convicted of
knowingly importing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). Caminos, 770 F.2d
at 362. The defendant attacked the jury instruction on the grounds that the judge
did not explain to the jury that to find the defendant guilty of "knowingly" import-
ing cocaine, they must find that the "defendant himself was subjectively aware of
the high probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man
would have been aware of the probability." Id. at 365. The Third Circuit, however,
held that the district court's instruction, which focused on the defendant's subjec-
tive awareness, satisfied the "deliberate ignorance" charge as set forth in United
States v.Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). Cami-
nos, 770 F.2d at 365 (citingJewel, 532 F.2d at 704 (stating that knowledge require-
ment, aside from "positive knowledge," is met if court instructs, and jury finds,
"beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was not actually aware ... his
ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely a result of... a conscious purpose to
avoid learning the truth"). Therefore, the application of the deliberate ignorance
standard in Caminos resulted in the defendant satisfying the requirement of "know-
ingly" importing cocaine. Id. at 366.
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The One 1973 Rolls Royce court noted that under the deliberate ignorance defi-
nition of Caminos, "willful blindness is a subjective state of mind that is deemed to
satisfy a scienter requirement of knowledge." One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 808.
Therefore, in adopting the Caminos standard of willful blindness, the One 1973
Rolls Royce court employed a subjective test and held that the deliberate igno-
rance/willful blindness requirement is met only if " 'the defendant himself was
subjectively aware of the high probability of the fact in question, and not merely
that a reasonable man would have been aware of the probability.' " Id. (quoting
Caminos, 770 F.2d at 365).
The court continued, stating that it was not apparent whether the district
court applied the subjective standard or an objective standard to Goodman's case
and therefore remanded the issue to the trial court with orders that the trial court
apply the subjective standard. Id. at 810. Moreover, the court mandated that on
remand,
Goodman must demonstrate that he was not subjectively aware of a high
probability that the Rolls Royce either was used or was going to be used to
facilitate an illegal drug transaction, or, if he was, that he took affirmative
steps reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether in fact
the vehicle was going to be or had been so used.
Id. at 812. The court noted that the mere fact that Goodman knew Scarfo was
accused of drug trafficking, would not, by itself show that Goodman was aware of a
high probability that the property was tainted. Id.
Although the majority could not determine whether the district court em-
ployed a subjective inquiry into Goodman's willful blindness, the dissent stated
that the district court did apply a subjective test. Id. at 821 (Nygaard, J., dissent-
ing). The district court's willful blindness standard read:
Lack of willful blindness sufficient to prevail as an innocent owner under
§ 881 (a) (4) (C) means that a claimant must show that he or she has not
ignored a signal or suggestion that a vehicle might have been used to
facilitate the trafficking of illegal drugs .... [O]nce the claimant chooses
to ignore the signal, he or she can no longer establish lack of willful
blindness to the prior use of the vehicle that would subject it to forfeiture.
Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 817 F.
Supp. 571, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). In his dissent, Judge Nygaard concluded that he
would affirm the district court's finding of willful blindness because the district
court employed the appropriate test and found that Goodman ignored obvious
signals that the Rolls Royce was tainted and subject to forfeiture when he acquired
it. Id. at 821 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
There is a split among the circuit courts, however, with regard to the meaning
of "willful blindness." Compare One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 808-09 (adopting
subjective standard for willful blindness) and United States v. One 1989 Jeep
Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172, 1175 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that willful blindness "in-
volves an owner who deliberately closes his eyes to what otherwise would have been
obvious and whose acts or omissions show a conscious purpose to avoid knowing
the truth") with United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884,
888-89 (lth Cir. 1989) (endorsing objective due care standard by requiring
owner to do "everything that a truly innocent owner reasonably could be expected
to do to insure that his vessel was not to be used illegally"). The Third Circuit in
One 1973 Rolls Royce also recognized the "willful blindness" debate among scholars
in that some believe that willful blindness is merely a surrogate for knowledge,
while others find that it is a less culpable state of mind. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43
F.3d at 808 n.12 (citing United States v.Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir.) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) ("There is disagreement as to whether reckless disregard for
the existence of a fact constitutes wilful blindness or some lesser degree of culpa-
bility .... There is also the question of whether to use an 'objective' test based on
the reasonable man, or to consider the defendant's subjective belief as disposi-
tive."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). The Third Circuit found the following
22
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finding that the claimant was willfully blind.113 The remainder of this
Note discusses the Third Circuit's analysis of the second issue.
1. 6109 Grubb Road is Controlling
The Third Circuit began its analysis by stating that although its prior
decision in 6109 Grubb Road involved an "innocent owner" defense under
§ 881 (a) (7), and One 1973 Rolls Royce involved an "innocent owner" de-
fense under § 881 (a) (4) (C), the rationale in 6109 Grubb Road was equally
applicable to One 1973 Rolls Royce.1 14 The court articulated two reasons
for treating the cases similarly. First, the court noted that even though
"willful blindness" appears only in § 881 (a) (4) (C), the legislative history of
§ 881 signalled that the "innocent owner" defenses are "virtually identi-
cal." 115 Therefore, the court concluded that the constructions should be
scholarly comments insightful regarding the debate over the appropriate interpre-
tation of "willful blindness": ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 776 (2d ed. 1969)
("One with a deliberate antisocial purpose in mind... may deliberately 'shut his
[or her] eyes' to avoid knowing what would otherwise be obvious to view. In such
cases, so far as the criminal law is concerned, the person acts at his peril in this
regard, and is treated as having 'knowledge' of the facts as they are ultimately
discovered to be."); GLANviur WiLuiAMs, CRIMINAL LAw, THE GENERAL PART § 57,
at 159 (2d ed. 1961) ("To the requirement of actual knowledge there is one strictly
limited exception .... [T] he rule is that if a party has his [or her] suspicion
aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he [or she]
wishes to remain in ignorance, he [or she] is deemed to have knowledge. The rule
that willful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential and is found through-
out the criminal law."); Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70
TEX. L. REv. 1351, 1429 (1992) ("Although wilful ignorance is usually employed to
satisfy a statutory mens rea of knowledge, the most prevalent definitions of the
doctrine describe a state of mind that is ... not as culpable as knowledge."); Ira P.
Robins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J.
CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 195 (1990) ("Deliberate ignorance constitutes reck-
lessness, rather than knowledge."); Edwards, Comment, The Criminal Degrees of
Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REv. 294, 298 (1954) ("For well nigh a hundred years, it has
been clear from the authorities that a person who deliberately shuts his eyes to an
obvious means of knowledge has sufficient mens rea for an offense based on such
words as . . .'knowingly.' "). One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 808 n.12.
113. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 800. The court concluded that a disjunc-
tive interpretation of the "innocent owner" defense of § 881 (a) (4) (C) was appro-
priate; therefore, a claimant could obtain relief under § 881 (a) (4) (C) despite a
finding that the claimant was willfully blind. Id. at 814. For a discussion of the
Third Circuit's analysis in deciding this issue, see infra notes 114-19 and accompa-
nying text.
114. Id. at 812-13. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in 6109
Grubb Road, see supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text. For the relevant text of
§ 881 (a) (7), see supra note 6. For the relevant text of § 881 (a) (4) (C), see supra
note 100.
115. Id. at 809. The court found the following remarks of members of Con-
gress relevant: (1) Representative Shaw stated that the § 881 (a) (4) (C) defense is
" 'virtually identical' " to the defense for innocent owners under § 881 (a) (6) and
(7) id. (quoting 134 CONG. REc. 33,290 (1988)); and (2) Representative Young
stated" 'It] he concept of willful blindness is essentially part of the proof of lack of
knowledge. For this reason, the defense for innocent owners of conveyances
seized for drug related offenses is virtually identical to the existing defenses for
1995] NOTE 745
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consistent-interpret "or" in all the subsections disjunctively so as to keep
the defenses "virtually identical." 116 Second, the court reasoned that be-
cause the 6109 Grubb Road court based its decision on the language and
structure of § 881 (a) (7), placing emphasis on the use of the traditionally
disjunctive word "or," One 1973 Rolls Royce mandated the same result in
that § 881 (a) (4) (C), with the exception of the "willful blindness" lan-
guage, contained identical language and structure as § 881 (a) (7).117
Therefore, the court concluded that "the innocent owner defense of
§ 881 (a) (4) (C) is available to any owner who can prove any one of either a
lack of knowledge, lack of consent, or lack of willful blindness."1 18 In light
of this conclusion, even if Goodman could not prove lack of willful blind-
ness, he would still be entitled to innocent owner status if he could prove
that he did not consent to the Rolls Royce's use in facilitating drug
transactions. 1 19
2. Problems Inherent in Adhering to 6109 Grubb Road
The Third Circuit acknowledged that an application of 6109 Grubb
Road to the facts of One 1973 Rolls Royce on remand inevitably would en-
innocent owners of real property ... or other things of value ...." Id. (quoting
134 CONG. REC. 33,290 (1988)).
116. Id. at 813.
117. Id. The court noted that the mere addition of the language "willful
blindness" has no impact on the construction of the section when the other lan-
guage and structure remains the same. Id. The court, however, did not mention
the underlying factual difference between the two cases that might mandate a dif-
ferent analysis. 6109 Grubb Road involved a pre-illegal-act owner while One 1973
Rolls Royce involved a post-illegal-act transferee. For a discussion of courts that have
made this distinction, see supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 814. In adopting the 6109 Grubb Road approach, the court rejected
the government's argument that such an interpretation would lead to the "absurd
result that every owner could establish an innocent owner defense." Id. at 813.
The court's rejection of the government's argument stemmed from the court's
and the government's differing definitions of willful blindness. Id. The govern-
ment assumed that knowledge and willful blindness are mutually exclusive. Id.
The government argued:
[I]f the court finds that the owner knew that the conveyance was used to
facilitate drug transactions, it must logically conclude that the owner was
not willfully blind thereto; concomitantly .... if the court finds that the
owner was willfully blind to the conveyance having been used to facilitate
drug transactions, it must necessarily conclude that the owner lacked
knowledge thereof.
Id. In response, the court noted that the government's premise-that knowledge
and willful blindness are mutually exclusive-is false. Id. The court referred to its
earlier discussion of willful blindness and acknowledged that "proof of willful
blindness has been sufficient to prove knowledge in the context of § 881 (a) (6)
and (7)" and that such proof is also sufficient to establish knowledge in the con-
text of § 881(a) (4) (C). Id. Therefore, "an owner's failure to prove a lack of willful
blindness simultaneously amounts to a failure to prove lack of knowledge for pur-
poses of the statute." Id. For a further discussion of the court's interpretation of
willful blindness, see supra note 112.
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able Goodman to prevail in that Goodman did not own the car at the time
of the drug transactions.1 20 Therefore, by definition, he could not have
consented to the vehicle's use in the illegal activities.' 21 Because he was a
post-illegal-act transferee, he was not in a position to prevent such use. 122
Thus, even if the government established that Goodman knew about, or
was willfully blind to the car's past improper use at the time he obtained
ownership of it, "he could not have consented to such improper use" and
would prevail under an "innocent owner" defense.12 3
The court defended the problematic after-effect of its decision-that
a post-illegal-act transferee would always prevail with an "innocent owner"
defense-by pointing to the "nearly impenetrable language of the statute"
and the intervening Supreme Court decision 92 Buena Vista Avenue.12 4
The court noted that the 6109 Grubb Road panel did not mention the pos-
sible effect of its interpretation on post-illegal-act transferees because at
the time 6109 Grubb Road was decided,
it was generally assumed that because of the "relation back" pro-
vision of the forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (h), which vested
tide in the United States at the moment of the illegal act, a post-
illegal-act transferee could never have better title than the
120. Id. at 814.
121. Id.; see United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1453 (11th Cir.
1995) (criticizing Third Circuit decision in One 1973 Rolls Royce, specifically stating,
"[cilassifying post-illegal act transferees as innocent owners because they had no
opportunity to consent creates a sweeping grant of immunity from forfeiture and a
gaping loophole in an intentionally comprehensive forfeiture policy"). For a dis-
cussion of the relevant facts of One 1973 Rolls Royce, see supra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text.
122. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 814. The court also acknowledged that
Goodman could prevail on remand if he could prove that he did not know the car
was being used in an illegal manner at the time of its use, or that if he knew, he
took all reasonable steps to prevent it. Id.
i23. Id.
124. Id. The court explained:
Filled with negatives, [§ 881 (a) (7)'s] language is nearly impenetrable.
The difficulty with the 6109 Grubb Road linguistic interpretation is
demonstrated by removing two of the negatives (which should not
change the meaning of the statute) and the burden of proof language
(which merely indicates who has to satisfy the requirements of the statute
without indicating what the party with the burden must show);
[ ] property shall be forfeited under [§ 881(a) (7)] to the extent of
an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission ... commit-
ted or omitted with[ ] the knowledge or consent of the owner.
Parsed with the negatives and the burden of proof language excised, the
statute provides that an act or omission committed under either of the
two conditions will preclude an innocent owner defense. If an act is com-
mitted with knowledge, the vehicle is forfeited, and if it is committed with
consent, it is forfeited. Thus, a conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, read-
ing seems plausible.
Id. at 815. For the unaltered text of § 881 (a) (7), see supra note 6.
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United States and could never benefit from the innocent owner
defense.1 25
The One 1973 Rolls Royce court, however, found its result to be consis-
tent with the canons of statutory interpretation and with § 881 (a) (4) (C)'s
legislative history and public policy. 126 The court noted that its disjunctive
interpretation of "or" avoided making the "consent" requirement "surplus-
age." 12 7 The court noted that if it interpreted the statute as requiring the
claimant to negate both knowledge and consent, the "consent" language
would be redundant.' 28 The court stated that "if a claimant established a
lack of knowledge, this would necessarily negate any consent to the illegal
activity, because 'in order to consent to drug activity, one must know about
it." -129 The court determined that its interpretation comported with the
standards of statutory construction mandating that each word be given ef-
fect and not be relegated to the position of surplusage.
The court, however, did confess that its rationale in 6109 Grubb Road
was vulnerable.1 30 The court admitted that a disjunctive reading of the
word "or" between the words knowledge and consent-as opposed to a
conjunctive interpretation-"arguably overlooked" the importance of the
context of the underlying issue in determining whether to apply a disjunc-
tive or conjunctive interpretation.13 1 The court acknowledged that
125. Id. at 817. The One 1973 Rolls Royce court noted that 92 Buena Vista Ave-
nue effectively makes the "knowledge or consent" language, as interpreted in 6109
Grubb Road, applicable to post-illegal-act transferees, therefore "creating the prob-
lem of insulating [from forfeiture] certain owners who one reasonably might not
consider to be deserving." Id. at 818. For a further discussion of the Supreme
Court's 92 Buena Vista Avenue opinion, see supra notes 23-30 and accompanying
text.
126. Id. at 814-18. For a further discussion of the relevant norms of statutory
construction, see supra note 81 and infra note 127. For a further discussion of the
legislative history of § 881 (a) (4) (C), see supra notes 104, 115 and accompanying
text.
127. Id. at 816. Under standards of statutory interpretation, statutes should
be interpreted so as to give effect to each word and avoid making words surplus.
See 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONsTRucTION § 46.06 (5th ed.
1992) (stating rule of construction that effect must be given to every word of stat-
ute and that no part should be rendered superfluous).
128. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 816.
129. Id. (quoting United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991)). The court, however, does not acknowl-
edge that the consent requirement would not be redundant if the claimant could
not establish lack of knowledge. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 172 (advocating ap-
proach to interpreting statute which would allow post-illegal-act claimant to prevail
if he or she could establish lack of knowledge alone, but requiring post-illegal-act
transferee claimant to negate consent if lack of knowledge is not established).
130. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 814. For the Third Circuit's analysis of a
possible conjunctive interpretation of § 881 (a) (7), see supra note 124.
131. Id. at 814-15. The court explained that if a statute provided that " 'no
cars or motorcycles are allowed in the park,' a person trying to keep a vehicle out
of the park need only show that the vehicle is either a car or a motorcycle." Id. at
815 (emphasis added). In this respect, a disjunctive interpretation is appropriate.
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whether terms joined by "or" are to be treated conjunctively or disjunc-
tively does not always turn on the use of the word "or" but rather it turns
on context.13 2 Nevertheless, the court stated: "We, of course, cannot
avoid the holding of [the 6109 Grubb Road] opinion .... ,113
The Third Circuit also explored the legislative history of
§ 881 (a) (4) (C), (6) and (7) and found little guidance as to whether the
"or" should be interpreted conjunctively or disjunctively.13 4 Although
parts of the legislative history suggest that Congress intended a conjunc-
tive reading, other parts of the legislative history show confusion as to how
Id. However, the court continued, if a person is trying to bring a vehicle into the
park, he or she must show that it is not a car and it is not a motorcycle. Id. In this
respect, a conjunctive interpretation is warranted. Id.
132. Id. at 815; see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (stating
terms connected by disjunctive word should be given their separate meanings un-
less context dictates otherwise); cf. United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363, 364
(8th Cir. 1989) (stating word "or" connotes disjunction except when disjunctive
reading would frustrate legislative intent); United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029,
1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that "or" is usually disjunctive, but this cannon is not
"inexorable" when it frustrates legislative intent), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
Regardless of the emphasis some courts may have placed on context, the Third
Circuit in One 1973 Rolls Royce followed a disjunctive reading of "or" in
§ 881(a)(4)(C). One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 814.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit disregarded a principle used in symbolic
knowledge called DeMorgan's Theorem. Id. at 815 n.19. DeMorgan's Theorem
illustrates how language phrased in the disjunctive can be rephrased in the con-
junctive. Id. The court noted that the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York referred to DeMorgan's Theorem in interpreting § 881 (a) (7)
in United States v. 890 Noyac Road, 739 F. Supp. 111, 113-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1990),
rev'd, 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1991). One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 815 n.19. For
example, § 881(a) (7) requires an owner to establish that the drug trafficking oc-
curred "without his [or her] knowledge or consent." Id. The Third Circuit noted
"[s]howing that something was without knowledge or consent is a denial of the
alternation; thus according to DeMorgan's Theorem, the owner must show the
conjunction of the denial, that is, that there was no knowledge and no consent."
Id. Despite its explanation of DeMorgan's Theorem, the Third Circuit refused to
apply this analysis to the issue at bar. Id.
133. Id. at 814 (citing Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedures 9.1).
Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 provides: "It is the tradition of this
court that the holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent
panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a published opinion
of a previous panel. Court in banc consideration is required to do so." Internal
Operating Procedures of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, PENN-
SYLVANIA RuLEs OF COURT, FEDERAL (1995). For a complete discussion of the Third
Circuit's analysis in 6109 Grubb Road, see supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
134. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 815 n.20. For a discussion of relevant
portions of the legislative history of § 881's "innocent owner" defense, see supra
notes 1, 5, 7, 80, 104, 115 and accompanying text.
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the statute would operate.1 3 5 Therefore, the Third Circuit noted the legis-
lative history was "not very helpful."
1 3 6
To further justify its reliance on the 6109 Grubb Road disjunctive ap-
proach to the "knowledge or consent" language, the majority recognized
that such a construction "ameliorates some of the harsh effects of the for-
feiture statute. 1 3 7 The court suggested that due to the ambiguity of the
statute and its punitive nature, the court must apply a rule of lenity, resolv-
ing the ambiguity in favor of the claimant.1 3 8 Finally, the court acknowl-
edged that the 6109 Grubb Road approach avoids the potential
constitutional problem of the statute being unduly oppressive.1 3 9
135. Id. The following statement suggested a conjunctive interpretation:
"'[T]he property would not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner knew or
consented to the [illegal conduct].' " Id. (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement,
supra note 69, 124 CONG. REc. 34,670, 34,672 (1978)), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522-23). The Third Circuit noted, however, that this
statement
apparently incorrectly intimated that the burden of proof as to knowl-
edge and consent was on the government, something that is clearly not
the case, and at least one commentator has concluded from this that the
statement may have incorrectly understood other aspects of the statute as
well, including whether the owner must prove both lack of knowledge
and lack of consent.
Id. at 815-16 n.20 (citing Loomba, supra note 11, at 484).
136. Id. at 816 n.20.
137. Id. at 816. The court noted that its interpretation allows "an owner to
keep the property when he or she has done everything reasonably possible to pre-
vent its use in drug activity." Id. The court cited two cases that allowed for the
claimant to assert an innocent owner defense successfully when he knew about the
illegal activity but attempted to stop it. Id.; see United States v. 710 Main St., 744 F.
Supp. 510, 524-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that landlord, whose building was
used in drug trafficking, who closed off portions of building, posted signs discour-
aging drug trafficking, restricted hours of operation of one of businesses and made
anonymous phone calls to police to report drug activity, was an innocent owner);
United States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 50-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (hold-
ing that landlord, who after admitting knowledge of drug activities in building,
cooperated with police to clean up building, pressed criminal charges against drug
dealers and allowed police to tear down fences and doors that dealers had con-
structed to avoid surveillance, had presented enough evidence to prevail on sum-
mary judgment). The Third Circuit neglected to acknowledge, however, that
these two cases did not involve post-illegal-act transferees as did One 1973 Rolls
Royce. For an explanation as to why this distinction is important, see the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis in United States v. 6640 S.W 48th Street, supra notes 49-64 and
accompanying text.
138. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 819. The court explained that
§ 881 (a) (4) is "punitive and quasi-criminal in nature." Id. (citing Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810-11 (1993)). The court decided, therefore, that it must
apply a rule of lenity pursuant to United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,
112 S. Ct. 2102, 2110 & n.10 (1992), which required the court to decide any ambi-
guity in statutory language in favor of the claimant. Id. The court concluded that
its disjunctive approach satisfied this requirement. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at
819.
139. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 816. The court noted that "[w] hen a
landlord cognizant of drug transactions occurring at his or her property tries to do
everything he or she reasonably can to prevent use of the property in that way, and
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3. Managing the Outcome
The Third Circuit stated that a possible solution to the problem of
applying 6109 Grubb Road to the facts of One 1973 Rolls Royce would be to
divide "potentially innocent owners into two categories, pre-illegal-act
owners and post-illegal-act transferees, and apply the 6109 Grubb Road dis-
junctive test to the first category but the conjunctive test to the second
one."1 40 The court, however, declined to engage in such an act of 'judi-
cial legislation" without any Congressional guidance.1 41 Instead, the ma-
jority found that it was not unreasonable to insulate post-illegal-act
transferees from forfeiture under § 881 (a) (4) and (7) and adhered to its
analysis and decision.1 4 2 In the end, the Third Circuit summoned Con-
the drug dealing continues, forfeiture of the property may be unduly oppressive."
Id.
140. Id. at 818. The court noted that the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida adopted this approach in dealing with § 881 (a) (7) in
United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 831 F. Supp. 1578, 1585 (S.D. Fla. 1993), aff'd,
41 F.3d 1448 (lth Cir. 1995). Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this approach on
appeal. 41 F.3d at 1453. For a further discussion of United States v. 6640 S.W 48th
Street, see supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
141. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 818. But see id. at 821 (stating that court
is "obligated to make sense of the statute and avoid a result that contradicts its
purpose") (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 819. The court noted that the principal goal of § 881 (a) (4) and
(7) is to "give owners of property an incentive to prevent use of that property in
the drug trade." Id. The court acknowledged that people who are not owners at
the time of the drug transaction are in no position to prevent such use and requir-
ing forfeiture of their property would "do little to accomplish the ends of those
forfeiture statutes." Id.
The Third Circuit also recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in 92
Buena Vista Avenue created doubt as to whether the forfeiture statutes reach post-
illegal-act transferees who do not learn of the illegal act until after it happened. Id.
The Third Circuit identified Supreme Court dicta that discussed whether post-
illegal-act transferees fall under § 881 (a) (6). Id. Although the plurality in 92
Buena Vista Avenue suggested that equitable principles might prevent such owners
from using the "innocent owner" defense, the Court avoided resolving the issue
and stated "respondent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of fact that
she had no knowledge of the alleged source of [the property]." United States v. 92
Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (1993). The Third Circuit also pointed to
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion which stated:
I do not find inconceivable the possibility that post-illegal-act transferees
with post-illegal-act knowledge of the earlier illegality are provided a de-
fense against forfeiture. The Government would still be entitled to the
property held by the drug dealer and by close friends and relatives who
are unable to meet their burden of proof as to ignorance of the illegal act
when it occurred.
One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 820 (quoting 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1142
(Scalia, J., concurring)). The Third Circuit argued that if Justice Scalia is right, it
is a "defensible" position to place post-illegal-act transferees with post-illegal-act
knowledge outside the scope of forfeiture, thereby providing support for the Third
Circuit's application of the 6109 Grubb Road interpretation of the "innocent
owner" defense to post-illegal-act transferees. Id.
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gress to redraft the statute if the court's interpretation was not as Congress
had intended.143
D. The Dissent's Approach in United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce
Judge Nygaard disagreed with the majority's opinion that 6109 Grubb
Road should control the court's interpretation of § 881(a) (4) (C). 144
Judge Nygaard noted that because § 881 (a) (4) (C) contains the "willful
blindness" language that is not used in § 881 (a) (6) and (7), the 6109
Grubb Road approach cannot be effectively applied to § 881 (a) (4) (C), es-
pecially when post-illegal-act transferees are involved.1 45 Judge Nygaard
argued that the majority's approach voids the "willful blindness" provision
"because a purchaser who is ignorant of a property's illicit use, whether
willfully or innocently, can logically neither grant nor deny consent to how
his predecessor used it."1' 46 Therefore, under a disjunctive approach, a
post-illegal-act transferee will always be able to prevail if he or she had no
legal interest in the property when it was used in the illegal transactions,
regardless of whether he or she was willfully blind to the conveyance's
taint when he or she received it.
147
143. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 820 ("Congress should redraft the statute,
if it desires a different result.").
144. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Judge Nygaard disagreed with the major-
ity's assertion that the Third Circuit's disjunctive interpretation in 6109 Grubb Road
can be applied to § 881 (a) (4) (C). Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting)
145. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Judge Nygaard stated that the legislative
history establishes that § 881 (a) (4) (C)'s "willful blindness" language is not mere
surplusage and therefore should be given effect. Id. at 822 (Nygaard, J., dissent-
ing). Because Congress used the "willful blindness" language in § 881(a) (4) (C),
and not in § 881 (a) (6) and (7) and intended for that language to be given effect,
the 6109 Grubb Road approach, which did not address the "willful blindness" addi-
tion, is inapplicable to § 881(a)(4)(C). Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Judge Nyg-
aard also argued that 6109 Grubb Road did not involve a post-illegal-act transferee,
thereby making the majority's adherence to the 6109 Grubb Road court's reasoning
that much more suspect. Id. at 821 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 820 (Nygaard,J., dissenting). Injudge Nygaard's view, the applica-
tion of 6109 Grubb Road's disjunctive reading to § 881 (a) (4) (C) involving willfully
blind, post-illegal-act transferees "wholly disregard [s]" that section's "willful blind-
ness" language and Congress' intent to prevent willfully blind owners from benefit-
ing from the innocent owner defense. Id. at 822 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of Congress' intent in adding the "willful blindness" language to
§ 881 (a) (4) (C), see supra notes 104, 115 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 822 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Judge Nygaard argued that "[i]f a
claimant fails to prove lack of willful blindness, but can alternatively prevail by
satisfying the sure-winner defense for a non-owner-lack of consent-then the
willful blindness language becomes utterly nullified." Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
As applied to Goodman, Judge Nygaard noted that even if the district court con-
cludes that Goodman was willfully blind to the Rolls Royce's taint when he re-
ceived it, that finding will be of no use. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Whether
Goodman is found to have been willfully blind or lacking knowledge will be of no
import because under either situation, Goodman could not give his consent. Id.
(Nygaard, J., dissenting). "In other words, willful blindness conceptually presup-
poses the absence of knowledge and consent." Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
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To avoid the absurd result from adhering to 6109 Grubb Road's dis-
junctive approach, Judge Nygaard supported interpreting the word "or" in
light of the context in which it is used so as to give the proper effect to the
terms Congress employed.' 48 Judge Nygaard concluded that a conjunctive
reading of § 881 (a) (4) (C) as applied to post-illegal-act transferees is neces-
sary because consent to the illegal activity is irrelevant if the claimant is a
post-illegal-act transferee. 14 9 Judge Nygaard stated that such an interpre-
tation is not 'judicial legislation."1 50
Furthermore, Judge Nygaard discussed the impact of 92 Buena Vista
Avenue. Judge Nygaard noted that the Supreme Court in 92 Buena Vista
Avenue, in dictum, addressed whether post-illegal-act transferees could as-
sert the "innocent owner" defense. 15 1 Judge Nygaard explained that the
Supreme Court's statement that equitable doctrines may "foreclose" a
claimant" 'with guilty knowledge of the tainted character of a property' "
from asserting an "innocent owner" defense, "leaned away from the major-
ity position here."152 Judge Nygaard concluded that the legislative history
of § 881 (a) (4) (C) 's willful blindness and the 92 Buena Vista Avenue dictum
supported the district court's analysis.' 53
V. ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT's APPROACH IN UITED STATES V.
ONE 1973 RoLLs RoYcE
A. Reliance on 6109 Grubb Road is Misplaced
In United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, the Third Circuit, in analyzing
the appropriate interpretation of § 881 (a) (4) (C), relied upon its reason-
148. Id. at 822 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Judge Nygaard explained that the
court must examine the context in which "or" is used because in some instances,
"or" should be read as "and." Id. at 822 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (citing Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (stating that terms connected by dis-
junctive word must be given their separate meanings unless context dictates other-
wise); United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that
"or" connotes disjunction except when disjunctive reading would frustrate legisla-
tive intent)).
149. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 823 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Judge Nyg-
aard would differentiate between owners who use their property to facilitate drug
transactions and willfully blind post-illegal-act transferees. Id. at 822 (Nygaard, J.,
dissenting). He concluded that applying 6109 Grubb Road to the former would
"make sense" but that it could not logically be applied to the latter. Id. (Nygaard,
J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 823 (Nygaard,J., dissenting). Judge Nygaard criticized the majority
for its "act of judicial abdication" and concluded that its decision was more than
just 'Judicial restraint." Id. at 821 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 823 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (1993)).
152. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (citing 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at
1137).
153. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
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ing in United States v. 6109 Grubb Road.154 Such reliance may have been
misplaced. First, the One 1973 Rolls Royce majority even noted that "the
rationale provided in 6109 Grubb Road is vulnerable." 155 In relying upon
the 6109 Grubb Road disjunctive interpretation of the "innocent owner"
defense, the court effectively created a class of claimants who will always be
able to successfully assert an "innocent owner" defense.' 5 6 Post-illegal-act
transferees will always prevail upon establishing lack of consent.157 Such a
result is contrary to Congress' intent in establishing the "innocent owner"
defense; Congress intended to fight illegal drug activity with the forfeiture
provisions, not insulate post-illegal-act transferees from forfeiture. 158
Second, 6109 Grubb Road interpreted § 881 (a) (7), which does not in-
clude the "willful blindness" language of § 881 (a) (4) (C).159 Therefore,
the court's interpretation in 6109 Grubb Road, is not binding on a subse-
quent case's interpretation of § 881 (a) (4) (C).160 As the dissent acknowl-
154. Id. at 814 (citing United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.
1989)). For a further discussion of United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, see supra notes
73-85 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. Id. According to the court, "the 6109 Grubb Road approach means that a
subsequent owner who did not know about the act creating the taint on the prop-
erty at or before it was committed would always be an innocent owner under the
statute." Id.; see Gurule, supra note 2, at 168 ("[T]he post-illegal act transferee will
almost always be able to satisfy the lack of consent requirement to qualify as an
innocent owner.").
157. Id. The Third Circuit, in One 1973 Rolls Royce, acknowledged that Good-
man could show that he did not consent to the improper use of the automobile by
proving that he did not own the car at the time it was so used; that he was not in a
position to prevent such use; and that he did not know that the car was being used
in that manner at the time it was so used, or if he did, he did everything that he
could to prevent that use. Id. Therefore, even if a claimant such as Goodman
knew about an automobile's improper use, or was willfully blind to that fact, at the
time he or she obtained ownership of it, he or she could still establish lack of
consent, and prevail as an "innocent owner." See id.; see also Gurule, supra note 2, at
172 (stating that post-illegal-act transferees would have had no interest in property
at time of illegal act and therefore would have had no reason to consent).
158. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 157, 172 (recognizing that civil forfeiture is
"weapon against illicit narcotics trafficking," but arguing that allowing post-illegal-
act transferees to prevail upon establishing lack of consent will further "sham"
transfers of property by the drug defendants to third parties); see also 134 CONG.
REc. 24,086 (1988) (stating that without addition of "willful blindness" language,
§ 881 (a) (4) (C) "would lead to a 'look-the-other-way' defense," thereby showing in-
tent of Congress to disallow defense to post-illegal-act transferees). For a further
discussion of the legislative history of § 881 (a) (4) (C), see supra notes 104, 115 and
accompanying text.
159. See United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 623 (3d Cir. 1989)
(interpreting § 881 (a) (7) disjunctively to grant innocent landowner defense upon
showing of either lack of knowledge or lack of consent). For the relevant text of
the § 881(a) (7) "innocent owner" defense, see supra note 6. For the relevant text
of the § 881 (a) (4) (C) "innocent owner" defense, see supra note 100.
160. See One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 821 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) ("I sim-
ply do not believe that Grubb even applies to post-illegal-act property purchasers
who are aware of or willfully blind to their property's use in facilitating illegal drug
transactions.").
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edged, the legislative history established that the "willful blindness"
language is not mere surplusage.16 l Applying a disjunctive interpretation
to § 881 (a) (4) (C), in cases involving a post-illegal-act transferee, however,
effectively nullifies the "willful blindness" language.162 Even if a post-ille-
gal-act transferee fails to prove lack of willful blindness, he or she will pre-
vail under the lack of consent defense.163 As the dissent noted, this is an
"absurd result with respect to willfully blind subsequent owners."' 64
B. The Impact of 92 Buena Vista Avenue
Furthermore, the Third Circuit decided 6109 Grubb Road prior to the
Supreme Court decision in 92 Buena Vista Avenue. In contrast, 92 Buena
Vista Avenue was established law when the Third Circuit decided One 1973
Rolls Royce and must be taken into consideration. 165 This distinction is
important because before 92 Buena Vista Avenue, the circuit courts were
divided as to whether post-illegal-act transferees could assert an "innocent
owner" defense. 166 Some circuit courts held that title in the property
vested in the government at the time of the illegal act, thereby precluding
post-illegal-act transferees from asserting an "innocent owner" defense.' 6 7
Subsequent to 92 Buena Vista Avenue, however, the courts permitted post-
illegal-act transferees to assert an "innocent owner" defense because 92
Buena Vista Avenue made clear that title did not vest in the government
until a judicial determination of forfeiture.1 68
The 6109 Grubb Road court did not address making a distinction be-
tween pre-illegal-act owners and post-illegal-act transferees because, in that
pre-92 Buena Vista Avenue era, a post-illegal-act transferee's interest in the
property was eliminated because title vested in the government at the time
of the illegal act.169 Although the 6109 Grubb Road court did not distin-
guish between pre-illegal-act owners and post-illegal-act transferees, given
161. Id. at 822 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 820 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (stating that majority reached its
conclusion because of its inability to reconcile 6109 Grubb Road and 92 Buena Vista
Avenue).
166. For a discussion of the different circuit courts' approaches to whether
tide vested in the government at the time of the illegal act or at the time of forfei-
ture, see supra note 29.
167. For a list of the circuit courts' holdings on this issue, see supra note 29.
168. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1136-37 (1993)
(holding that until government wins forfeiture judgment, owner of property may
assert any available defense). For a discussion of 92 Buena Vista Avenue, see supra
notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
169. See United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1452 n.9 (11th Cir.
1995) (noting that Congress did not address post-illegal-act transferees when it
drafted § 881 because before 92 Buena Vista Avenue "a post-illegal-act transferee's
interest in the property was automatically eradicated because title vested in the
government on the date of the illegal act").
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the Supreme Court's intervening decision in 92 Buena Vista Avenue, the
Third Circuit should not have foreclosed this approach when deciding
One 1973 Rolls Royce.17
0
In addition, the plurality in 92 Buena Vista Avenue stated that equita-
ble doctrines may not allow a party "with guilty knowledge of the tainted
character of the property" to assert an "innocent owner" defense. 171
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's dicta, it
failed to act upon it. 172 Instead, the One 1973 Rolls Royce court found sup-
port for its position from Justice Scalia, who suggested in his concurring
opinion in 92 Buena Vista Avenue that it would not be absurd to think that
post-illegal-act transferees were out of the scope of forfeiture statutes.
173
C. Questionable Statutory Interpretation
Aside from precedent, the Third Circuit also relied upon standards of
statutory construction in its interpretation of § 881 (a) (4) (C).174 Similarly,
the court's analysis in this area was somewhat flawed. The court adhered
to a traditional disjunctive interpretation of the word "or," while ignoring
the particular context in which the word was used. 175 The context of the
"without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness" language of
§ 881 (a) (4) (C) suggests a conjunctive interpretation because a disjunctive
interpretation would ignore the inclusion of the phrase "willful blind-
ness."1 76 AsJudge Nygaard explained in his dissent, a disjunctive interpre-
tation would allow a subsequent owner, who failed to investigate an
"obvious possibility" that his or her property is forfeitable, the ability to
always establish "innocent owner" status on the basis of lack of consent. 17
7
The majority noted that the court "arguably overlooked" the importance
170. See United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 818-19 (3d Cir.
1994) (refusing to create two classes of claimants in its interpretation of "innocent
owner" defenses). But see 6640 S.W 48th St., 41 F.3d at 1453 (stating lack of con-
sent defense "is not available to post-illegal act transferees"); Gurule, supra note 2,
at 172 (advocating legislative amendments to "innocent owner" defense distin-
guishing between pre-illegal-act owners and post-illegal-act transferees).
171. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1137.
172. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 819.
173. Id. at 819-20 (citing 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1142 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). For the portion of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion that the One
1973 Rolls Royce majority relied upon, see supra note 142.
174. Id. at 814-15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of
various standards of statutory construction, see supra notes 81, 127 and accompany-
ing text.
175. Id. at 822-23 (Nygaard, J., dissenting); see United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th
St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1453 (11th Cir. 1995) (interpreting "or" in the conjunctive and
requiring post-illegal-act transferee to prove lack of knowledge and lack of consent
to prevail as "innocent owner" under § 881 (a) (7)).
176. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 822 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
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of context in adopting a disjunctive interpretation in 6109 Grubb Road.1 78
Nevertheless, the court adhered to the disjunctive interpretation. 179
VI. IMPACT
As the Third Circuit noted in United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, the
disjunctive interpretation of § 881 (a) (4) (C) will result in the ability of all
post-illegal-act transferees, who can establish a lack of consent, to assert a
successful "innocent owner" defense.18 0 In doing so, as the dissent indi-
cated, the majority effectively read out of the statute the "willful blindness"
language. 181 Moreover, in the face of Congress' intent to use § 881 to
fight the increase of drug crimes in the United States, the Third Circuit's
interpretation clashes with any possible "crack down" on crime Congress
might have achieved.1 82
Separating claimants under § 881 (a) (4) (C), as well as under
§ 881 (a) (6) and (7), into pre-illegal-act owners and post-illegal-act trans-
ferees would avoid this insulating effect.183 The pre-illegal-act owners
would benefit from a lack of consent defense and prevail under a disjunc-
tive interpretation, while under a conjunctive interpretation, the post-ille-
gal-act transferees would not be able to avoid forfeiture by asserting a lack
of consent defense.1 84 Although the Eleventh Circuit adopted this ap-
proach in United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th Street,185 the majority in One 1973
Rolls Royce declined to engage in such a form of 'judicial legislation." 18 6
Perhaps, however, dissenting Judge Nygaard is correct by stating that in-
stead, the majority engaged in 'Judicial abdication." 187
178. Id. at 814-15.
179. Id. at 814.
180. Id.; see Gurule, supra note 2, at 168 ("The post-illegal act transferee would
• . .always qualify as an innocent owner and hold superior title over the govern-
ment."). Professor Gurule has indicated that a disjunctive interpretation of the
"innocent owner" defense as applied to post-illegal-act transferees would "enable a
defendant to avoid civil forfeiture entirely by simply transferring his ill-gotten gains
to a third-party who had knowledge of the origins of the property, but did not
consent to the defendant trafficking in narcotics." Id.
181. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 822 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
182. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 173 (indicating that forfeiture is "potent
weapon in the war against drugs" but acknowledging its weakness under current
statutory scheme). For a discussion of Congress' intent behind the drug forfeiture
statutes, see supra notes 1, 5, 7, 80, 104, 115 and accompanying text.
183. See United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1453 (11th Cir.
1995) (applying conjunctive interpretation of § 881 (a) (7) to post-illegal-act
transferees).
184. See id.
185. Id. at 1453. The Eleventh Circuit stated, "We decline to follow the Third
Circuit's reasoning [in One 1973 Rolls Royce]. Classifying post-illegal act transferees
as innocent owners because they had no opportunity to consent creates a sweeping
grant of immunity from forfeiture and a gaping loophole in an intentionally com-
prehensive forfeiture policy." Id.
186. United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 818 (3d Cir. 1994).
187. Id. at 821 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
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If other courts view the Eleventh Circuit's approach as the Third Cir-
cuit would-as 'judicial legislation"-Congress must respond to the Third
Circuit's request for clarification. Congress has introduced two bills di-
rected at the "innocent owner" defense.1 88 One of the bills would allow a
claimant to prevail if he or she could prove that he or she was either with-
out knowledge or did not consent to the illegal drug activity. 18 9 Another
bill would result in vast changes to the forfeiture scheme, mandating that
forfeiture proceedings only be conducted after the owner of the property
was convicted for the relevant crime.19 0 Neither of these bills, however,
would solve the unique problem presented when the claimant is a post-
illegal-act transferee.
Instead, any legislative amendment must take into account the differ-
ences between pre-illegal-act owners and post-illegal-act transferees. 191
For example, Professor Gurule suggests allowing a pre-illegal-act owner,
without knowledge that the property has been used for an illegal purpose,
to prevail by merely establishing such lack of knowledge, because forfei-
ture of his or her property would be unfair.1 92 If such pre-illegal-act
owner, however, had knowledge of the illegal activity, then he or she
would be required to establish lack of consent to prevail under the "inno-
cent owner" defense.193 In addressing post-illegal-act transferees, Profes-
188. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 160 (citing H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 3347, 103d Cong., 1st (1994)).
189. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 160 (citing H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993)).
190. See id. (citing H.R. 3347, 103d Cong., 1st (1994)).
191. See id. at 172; see also One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 823 (Nygaard, J.,
dissenting) (advocating separating claimants into pre-illegal-act owners and post-
illegal-act transferees and applying different tests to the different types of
claimants).
192. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 172 (advocating adopting disjunctive inter-
pretation if pre-illegal-act owner lacked knowledge of illegal activity); see also
United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 (11th Cir. 1992)
(adopting disjunctive interpretation of "knowledge or consent" language of
§ 881 (a) (7) as applied to pre-illegal-act owner); United States v. 141st St. Corp.,
911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d
618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989) (same). But see United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443,
1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (adopting conjunctive interpretation of "knowl-
edge or consent" language thereby requiring pre-illegal-act owner to prove lack of
knowledge and lack of consent to prevail under "innocent owner" defense of
§ 881 (a) (7)).
193. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 172 (advocating adoption of conjunctive in-
terpretation for pre-illegal-act owners with knowledge because claimant with
knowledge should not prevail under "innocent owner" defense if he or she took
no action to prevent illegal activity); id. (stating that lack of consent "should be
construed to mean that the claimant took all reasonable steps to prevent his [or
her] property from being used illegally"); see also Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d at 1445
(adopting conjunctive interpretation of "knowledge or consent" language thereby
requiring pre-illegal-act owner to prove lack of knowledge and lack of consent to
prevail under "innocent owner" defense of § 881 (a) (7)) (per curiam). But see
Dunne, supra note 11, at 85 n.25 ("Forfeiture upon knowledge alone can lead to
an unconscionable result if the owner acquires knowledge of illegal use but has no
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sor Gurule favors a conjunctive approach to the "innocent owner"
defense, requiring such claimants to prove lack of knowledge because the
consent requirement, as applied to such claimants, is rather "meaning-
less."1 9 4 Although Professor Gurule did not specifically address the "will-
ful blindness" language of the § 881 (a) (4) (C) "innocent owner" defense,
any legislative amendment must make clear that a post-illegal-act trans-
feree claimant under § 881 (a) (4) (C) must also establish lack of willful
blindness to prevail. 19 5 A claimant should not be permitted to prevail by
establishing lack of knowledge alone. To do so would render the "willful
blindness" language surplusage.1 96
VII. CONCLUSION
Practitioners in the Third Circuit must stay abreast of any changes in
this area of the law. First, due to the split of opinion among the circuit
courts with regard to the interpretation of the "innocent owner" defense
of § 881 (a) (4) (C), (6) and (7), attorneys must be aware of the Supreme
Court's activities. 19 7 Practitioners must watch for the Supreme Court
granting certiorari on any cases in these areas.
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari on any of these cases, practition-
ers should focus on how the Supreme Court addresses the unique situa-
tion that arises when applying the "innocent owner" defenses to post-
illegal-act transferees. 198 Will the Court advance the plurality's view in
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, that equitable principles might pre-
reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to governmental seizure." (quoting Eric
G. Zajac, Tenancies by the Entirety and Federal Civil Forfeiture Under the Crime Abuse
Prevention and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, 54 U. PrTr. L. REv. 553, 571 (1993))).
194. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 172 (stating that such conjunctive interpreta-
tion would "prevent sham transfers of property intended to avoid forfeiture and
further comport with the intent of Congress, which is to deprive the wrongdoer of
his ill-gotten gains"); see also United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1453
(11th Cir. 1995) (requiring post-illegal-act transferees to establish lack of knowl-
edge in order to prevail under "innocent owner" defense of § 881 (a) (7)).
195. See Gurule, supra note 2, at 172-73 (stating that post-illegal-act transferee
must establish lack of knowledge, but failing to address the "willful blindness" lan-
guage of § 881 (a) (4) (C)); see also 6640 S.W 48th St., 41 F.3d at 1453 (stating that
post-illegal-act transferee claimant under § 881 (a) (7) must establish lack of knowl-
edge to prevail).
196. United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 817 F. Supp. 571, 581 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (acknowledging that "willful blindness" language of § 881 (a) (4) (C) "cannot
be given effect" if disjunctive interpretation is applied to that section), vacated, 43
F.3d 794 (3d Cir. 1994).
197. See e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Justices to Rule on Use of Criminal Case And Forfei-
ture Suit Against Defendants, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1996, at B3 (discussing Supreme
Court's decision to hear case to decide whether criminal prosecutions accompa-
nied with civil forfeiture suits violate Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy).
198. For a complete discussion of the various approaches the circuits have
adopted regarding the § 881 "innocent owner" defenses, see supra notes 31-85,
112-53 and accompanying text.
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vent a post-illegal-act transferee with knowledge of the illegal act at the
time of the transfer from enjoying the benefit of the "innocent owner"
defense?199 Or will the Court advance Justice Scalia's suggestion that it is
not "inconceivable" that post-illegal-act transferees with post-illegal-act
knowledge may be afforded a defense to forfeiture of their property?200 If
the Court follows the former, the Third Circuit's analysis in One 1973 Rolls
Royce will not stand.2 0 1 If, however, the Court adopts Justice Scalia's sug-
gestion, the Third Circuit's analysis will gain support.20 2
Until any intervening actions by the Supreme Court or Congress,
practitioners must live by the Third Circuit's interpretation of
§ 881 (a) (4) (C) in One 1973 Rolls Royce. Attorneys for post-illegal-act trans-
feree claimants will enjoy the leniency of the Third Circuit's approach,
while attorneys for the government will struggle to circumvent the impact
of the decision.
Patricia A. 0 Weill
199. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (1993). For a
further discussion of the 92 Buena Vista Avenue dicta, see supra note 152 and ac-
companying text.
200. Id. at 1142 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a further discussion of Justice
Scalia's statements in 92 Buena Vista Avenue, see supra note 142.
201. See United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 823 (3d Cir.
1994) (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (acknowledging Supreme Court's 92 Buena Vista
Avenue dicta and finding conjunctive interpretation of § 881(a) (4) (C) appropri-
ate). For a further discussion of the 92 Buena Vista Avenue dicta, see supra note 152
and accompanying text.
202. See id. at 820 (arguing that granting post-illegal-act transferees with post-
illegal-act knowledge "innocent owner" defense is not absurd). For a further dis-
cussion of Justice Scalia's statements in 92 Buena Vista Avenue, see supra note 142.
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